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 1 
PRIVACY VS. PROTECTION: WHY 
TRACKING MOBILE-DEVICE LOCATION 
DATA WITHOUT A WARRANT REQUIRES A 
FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCEPTION 
Andrew J. Stover+ 
“For time and the world do not stand still. Change is the law of life. And 
those who look only to the past or the present are certain to miss the future.”1 
– John F. Kennedy 
 
Imagine an America where the police and government were able to determine 
where people have been, or even where they currently are, just by looking at 
their mobile-device. An America where the government tracks the places one 
travels without limit; an America eerily reminiscent of George Orwell’s 1984.2  
That America could be fast approaching based on recent legal rulings.3 If left 
unchecked, modern America may become fictional Oceania.4 
On May 31, 2016, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Eleventh Circuits in ruling that law enforcement’s requests for mobile-
device data records from service providers are not searches under the Fourth 
                                                          
+ B.A. 2015, The Pennsylvania State University; J.D. 2018, Michigan State University 
College of Law. 
 
1 John F. Kennedy, Address in the Assembly Hall at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt (June 25, 
1963). 
 2 See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 at 5 (Signet Classic 1961) (“[T]he eyes follow you about 
when you move. Big Brother Is Watching You.”). 
 3 See id. at 6 (“[A] helicopter skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for an instant 
like a blue-bottle and darted away again with a curving flight. It was the Police Patrol, 
snooping into people’s windows.”); see e.g., State v. Tate, 849 N.W.2d 798, 805–806 (Wis. 
2014) (reasoning how a defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when 
one “is traveling down a public highway.”). 
 4 See ORWELL, supra note 2, at 7 (“Winston kept his back turned to the telescreen. It 
was safer; though as he well knew, even a back can be revealing.”). 
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Amendment and thus do not require a warrant.5 While circuits to hear cases on 
this issue may all be in agreement, lower federal courts outside of those circuits’ 
jurisdictions are not so united.6 No circuit yet to rule on the issue controls a 
jurisdiction in which a district court has ruled in favor of privacy rights.7 
Although this particular issue is novel due to the growing use of mobile devices 
and Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking, it is part of a family of issues 
that have been proceeding through the courts since the turn of the century.8 
Scholarship on tracking mobile-device location data has focused on the 
increased use of such data by law enforcement to deduce suspects’ physical 
                                                          
 5 See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1018 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding the 
search of “an individual’s location (or a cell phone’s location), so long as the tracking does 
not reveal movements within the home (or hotel room), does not cross the sacred threshold 
of the home” and does not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 
498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (reasoning the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy because when he registered his phone with the carrier, he voluntarily provided his 
personal information); In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 
724 F.3d 600, 611 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that compelling “cell phone service providers to 
produce the historical cell site information of their subscribers [were not] per se 
unconstitutional.”); see also Jenna McLaughlin, Appeals Court Delivers Devastating Blow 
to Cellphone-Privacy Advocates, INTERCEPT (May 31, 2016), 
https://theintercept.com/2016/05/31/appeals-court-delivers-devastating-blow-to-cell-phone-
privacy-advocates/; No warrant needed to get cell phone location: US court, PHYS.ORG 
(May 31, 2016), http://phys.org/news/2016-05-warrant-cell-court.html (explaining 
individuals who “voluntarily disclosed to a third party” and in those cases, “cell phone users 
‘voluntarily’ give that data to carriers whenever they make a call or send a text message” 
and have no expectation of privacy). 
 6 See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427-28 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding the 
defendants “assumed the risk” when the phone company turned over the defendants’ cell 
phone information); In re Application for Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal 
Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1039, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2015); United States v. Lambis, 
744 F. Supp. 3d 606, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 7 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 507, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc); 
United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Skinner, 690 
F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 8 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477 (2014) (holding that police generally 
cannot search the contents of an arrested person’s cell phone without a warrant); United 
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2010) (holding that attaching GPS devices to cars 
constitutes a search that requires a warrant). See generally Naomi LaChance, At Supreme 
Court, Debate Over Phone Privacy Has A Long History, NPR (Mar. 8, 2016), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/02/29/468609371/at-supreme-court-
debate-over-phone-privacy-has-a-long-history (explaining, for example, the Supreme Court 
has unanimously held attaching GPS devices to cars constitutes a search that requires a 
warrant); Alex Alben, How to protect privacy in the digital age: a constitutional 
amendment, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/how-to-
protect-privacy-in-the-digital-age-a-constitutional-amendment/ (proposing for a new 
amendment to “safeguard privacy as a first principle of American law,” given that 
“widespread deployment of GPS . . . our digital footprints are tracked and recorded.”). 
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locations, usually without a warrant.9 As is often the case, scholarship is divided 
as to the legality of law enforcement’s compelling companies to disclose 
records—without a warrant—in order to track a suspect.10 On one side is 
scholarship that recognizes the need for law enforcement to protect the general 
public, which agrees with the circuits that such information retrieval is not a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.11 On the other side is scholarship that 
emphatically argues such use of mobile-device location data is a search and—
without a warrant—is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.12 Some 
scholarship advocates for an approach from both the judiciary and society 
towards being more informed and not simply applying “blind justice,” which is 
to say refraining from making gut reactions and uninformed decisions by taking 
into account data and evidence.13 
This Comment advocates for the recognition of a new exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement. Law enforcement’s tactic of arresting 
suspects by using location tracking data, obtained by compelling service 
                                                          
 9 Martin Dolan, Noreen Lennon & Karen Munoz, Use of Cell Phone Records and GPS 
Tracking, 24 CBA REC. 38, 39 (2010); see, e.g., Brian L. Owsley, Cell Phone Tracking in 
the Era of United States v. Jones and Riley v. California, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 207, 227 
(2015) (stating, under the third-party doctrine, mobile device users do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy to their location data); Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain 
Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 
66 EMORY L.J. 527, 535 (2017). 
 10 Compare Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 41 
(2013), with Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A 
Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 715 (2011) (explaining how law 
enforcement can compel companies to turn over various phone data as permissible while 
others contend the constitutional implications of obtaining public data). 
 11 RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43586, THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE  (2014) (noting the third-party doctrine and 
compulsion of location data can be harmonized with Fourth Amendment case law); see, e.g., 
William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 885 
(1991) (suggesting law enforcement should be able to search without a warrant because 
“[t]he reasons for requiring warrants are genuine, but not strong; it is entirely plausible that 
the system would function better without them.”). 
 12 See Alessandra Suuberg, Big Foot, Big Brother . . . and a Big Step Backwards for 
Your Fourth Amendment Rights: The Sixth Circuit Approves Warrantless Cell Phone 
Tracking in United States v. Skinner, 15 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 319, 330 (2012); see 
also Ian Herbert, Where We Are with Location Tracking: A Look at the Current Technology 
and the Implications on Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 442, 
448 (2011) (explaining GPS can “reveal the target’s location every second of every day, 
while others only provide information when asked.”). 
 13 Baradaran, supra note 10, at 3–4 (“Blind balancing” is “the process of decision 
making based simply on common sense and a gut assessment of risk, without consideration 
of data, evidence, or empirical studies” and ensures “important privacy rights enshrined in 
the Fourth Amendment are protected by individuals who are seen as criminals in the eyes of 
the court . . . [B]ecause the harmed party is identified as a criminal at the outset, the balance 
starts skewed in favor of the government.”). 
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providers to disclose users’ mobile-device information, may constitute a 
“search,” yet it may be a “search” that is not unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment.14 The Supreme Court, due to recent lower court rulings, should 
take up the issue and create a new exception to the warrant requirement that 
protects privacy interests in electronic data contained on one’s mobile device.15 
This exception must recognize a presumption of privacy in mobile devices, thus 
making it a search requiring a warrant to obtain location data.16 The exception 
would then balance citizens’ privacy interests against governmental interests, 
requiring the government to overcome the presumption of privacy through a 
strong showing of need.17 
Part I discusses the evolving history of mobile devices in the United States, 
beginning with the rise of mobile devices, data networks, and modern “smart 
phones,” and gives a general overview of differing approaches to location data 
protections.18 Part II provides an overview of federal court jurisprudence on the 
issue of whether police’s obtaining location data records without a warrant is an 
unconstitutional search.19 Part III offers an overview of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence regarding similar issues pertaining to location tracking and data 
privacy.20 Part IV analyzes how such uses of location tracking data by law 
enforcement are unconstitutional searches when conducted without a warrant in 
                                                          
 14 See Jeremy H. Rothstein, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment and the Use of 
Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 530 (2012) (explaining 
how cell phone users “voluntarily disclose their location to third parties merely by carrying 
a cell phone that can be tracked with GPS.”); e.g., Charles Blain, Police Could Get Your 
Data Location Without A Warrant. That Has To End, WIRED (Feb. 2, 2017, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2017/02/police-get-location-data-without-warrant-end/ (describing 
how the victim was able to receive a restraining order because the defendant stalked her 
using his cell phone). 
 15 See, e.g., David Smith, Supreme court considers limits on police tracking via mobile 
phone data, GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2017, 4:45 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/nov/29/supreme-court-considers-limits-on-police-
tracking-via-mobile-phone-data (discussing the implications of the government relying on a 
1979 Supreme Court decision that distinguished between phone records and the actual 
conversations in this modern era). 
 16 See Henry F. Fradella, Weston J. Morrow, Ryan G. Fischer & Connie Ireland, 
Quantifying Katz: Empirically Measuring Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the Fourth 
Amendment Context, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 289, 311 (2011) (arguing that the technological 
advancements of this era calls for updated outlooks of constitutional privacy concerns). 
 17 See, e.g., Glenn Chatmas Smith, We’ve Got Your Number (Is it Constitutional to Give 
It Out): Caller Identification Technology and the Right to Informational Privacy, 37 UCLA 
L. REV. 145, 199 (1989); see also Suuberg, supra note 12, at 330 (explaining how many 
entities criticized United States v. Skinner because it denies “an expectation of privacy in 
cell phones.”). 
 18 Infra Part I. 
 19 Infra Part II. 
 20 Infra Part III. 
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certain instances, but not others, and how the proposed exception would 
operate.21 
I. EVOLVING HISTORY OF A MOBILE NETWORK SOCIETY 
Over the past forty-three years, the United States has become increasingly 
reliant on mobile devices.22 In under two generations, mobile technology has 
boomed, with over 64% of American adults owning a smartphone.23 With the 
rise of mobile-device usage the ability of law enforcement to use such devices 
as a tool to track suspects has also risen.24 The prevalence of mobile devices in 
everyday life has led to approaches for tracking location data,25 ranging from 
allowing police to track without a warrant26 to requiring police to obtain a 
warrant before tracking.27 The issue of tracking suspects through their location 
                                                          
 21 Infra Part IV. 
 22 See Freiwald, supra note 10, at 681, 702 (explaining location data provides law 
enforcement information about an individual’s arrival and departure time and from where); 
see also Ellen Gibson, Smartphone dependency: a growing obsession with gadgets, USA 
TODAY (July 7, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/medical/health/medical/ 
mentalhealth/story/2011/07/Smartphone-dependency-a-growing-obsession-to-
gadgets/49661286/1 (remarking that added dependence on mobile devices comes as 
Americans choose mobile phones over iPods, cameras, maps, and address books). 
 23 Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/; see also Blain, supra 
note 14 (“[O]n average, American millennials check their phone roughly 82 times a day.”). 
 24 See, e.g., Mara Van Ells, Law enforcement officers use cellphone tracking as a tool, 
BISMARCK TRIB. (May 26, 2012), http://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/crime-and-
courts/law-enforcem…racking-as-a-tool/article_23531016-a5c1-11e1-a957-
0019bb2963f4.html (explaining how “cellphone information is a very useful tool for law 
enforcement and prosecutors.”); cf. Jamie Condliffe, Warrantless Tracking of Phone 
Location Data Could Get Harder, MIT TECH. REV. (June 6, 2017), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608042/warrantless-tracking-of-cell-phone-location-
data-by-the-police-could-get-harder (tracking criminals could prove to be difficult despite 
the advent of cell phone use). 
 25 See, e.g., Cell Phone Location Tracking Laws by State, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/map/cell-phone-location-tracking-laws-state (last visited May 24, 
2018); Charles Arthur, iPhone keeps record of everywhere you go, GUARDIAN (Apr. 20, 
2011, 9:06 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/apr/20/iphone-tracking-
prompts-privacy-fears (“Apple’s iPhone keep track of where you go – and saves every detail 
of it to a secret file on the device which is then copied to the owner’s computer when the 
two are synchronised [sic].”). 
 26 See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 774, 777, 781 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that the defendant “did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the GPS data and 
location on his cell phone.”). 
 27 See Pub. Act 098-1104, § 10 ILL. GEN. ASSEMB. (Ill. 2014) (“[A] law enforcement 
agency shall not obtain current or future location information pertaining to a person or his or 
her effects without first obtaining a court order based on probable cause.”); see Skinner, 690 
F.3d at 774, 777, 781. 
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data is one that continues to grow and sow disagreement.28 
A. Overview of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence: A Primer 
The Fourth Amendment is one of the most zealously coveted and protected 
parts of the United States Constitution.29 It guarantees the right of Americans, 
“the people,” to be free from searches of their homes, personal effects, and body, 
as well as seizure of their persons and property by the government without 
reasonable grounds.30 Additionally, before the government may search or seize 
it must obtain a warrant, which is based on probable cause supported by 
statements, or evidence that describes the place being searched and the people 
or items being seized.31 
One of the more important aspects of the Fourth Amendment is the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” inquiry,32 which is both a legal standard33 
and a constitutional safeguard.34 As formulated by Justice Harlan’s concurrence 
in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the existence of reasonable 
expectations of privacy in persons, places, and objects are determined using a 
two-part test.35 That test has been applied for the past fifty years by United States 
courts to determine whether privacy rights attach to Americans’ interactions, 
possessions, technologies, living quarters, and countless other areas.36 
                                                          
 28 See, e.g., Cell Phone Location Tracking Laws by State, supra note 25 (explaining 
how “the status of your privacy protections depends on where you are. For example, your 
location information is protected in Montana, but not in Georgia.”). 
 29 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., Barry Friedman & Orin Kerr, The Fourth 
Amendment, NAT’L CONST. CENT., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/amendments/amendment-iv (last visited May 24, 2018) (understanding the 
Fourth Amendment “places restraints on the government any time it detains (seizes) or 
searches a person or property.”). 
 30 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 31 See id.; see, e.g., Probable Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A 
reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime or that a 
place contains specific items connected with a crime.”). 
 32 Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 n.3 (2012) (explaining how the 
Fourth Amendment values one’s property rights and when the Government installs a GPS 
on a vehicle, they have physically intruded on a constitutionally protected area). 
 33 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (1967). 
 34 Id. (stating the infamous legal standard that there are places and objects in which a 
person has “a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”). Cf. Jones, 565 
U.S. at 404–05 n.3. 
 35 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining Justice Harlan’s test 
comprised an inquiry into (1) whether the person exhibited an actual expectation of privacy, 
and (2) whether society recognizes the expectation as reasonable). 
 36 Cf. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7, 9–10 (2013); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
27, 32, 35 (2001); United States v. Padin, 787 F.2d 1071, 1076 (6th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Cabrera, No. 11–117–GMS, 2014 WL 3540894, at *14 (D. Del. July 15, 2014). In 
2018] Privacy vs. Protection 7 
The newest frontier for the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy inquiry is that of mobile-device user data.37 Courts have been grappling 
with whether citizens have privacy rights to their data and whether those rights 
rise to the level of protection granted in Katz.38 Even the Supreme Court has 
entered the fray, weighing in on the constitutionality of warrantless searches of 
cell phone videos and images, GPS tracking devices on cars, and pen registers 
on home phones.39 Yet until recently, the Court has declined to address the issue 
of warrantless tracking of location data by law enforcement.40 That decision, 
expected sometime in 2018, could definitively determine whether the Fourth 
Amendment applies to citizens’ mobile device data.41 
B. The Rise of Technology (GPS and Data) in the United States 
Technology has quickly become present in almost every facet of American 
life, spurring a revolution of new portable devices that rely on mobile networks, 
which constantly communicate location data to service providers.42 While the 
mobile-device may now be an everyday norm, it elicited ridicule when first 
released.43 History proved even the most astute experts to be sensationally 
                                                          
fact, as of May 23, 2018, Katz has been cited 12,314 times by courts in the United States. 
Citing References for Katz v. United States, Westlaw KeyCite, 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/RelatedInformation/I64df71169c1d11d9bc61beebb95be672/kcC
itingReferences.html?docSource=57694273439b4fb49d17ae3493cb2634&pageNumber=1&
facetGuid=h562dbc1f9a5f4b0c9e54031a19076b9c&transitionType=ListViewType&context
Data=(sc.DocLink) (search Katz v. United States; then click on the case; then click Citing 
References on menu bar and choose cases from the menu on the left). 
 37 See, e.g., Jeremy Fogel, From the Bench: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 
LITIG. J., Spring 2014, at 1. 
 38 Cf.  Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1351, 1359 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008); United States v. Pierre, 435 Fed. Appx. 905, 908 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 39 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489–90 (2014) (reasoning that searching a 
phone’s physical properties to determine danger is different from searching a phone’s 
internal data, with the latter being unconstitutional without a warrant); United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408–09 (2012) (holding that GPS tracking devices attached to vehicles 
outside the scope of a warrant are unconstitutional); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 
(1979) (ruling that there is no expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from a home 
phones owned by the service provider). 
 40 See Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Supreme Court to Settle Major Cellphone Privacy Case, 
REUTERS (June 5, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-mobilephone-
idUSKBN18W1RY (explaining, in technology and criminal law cases, the Supreme Court 
has ruled that “a warrant is required to place a GPS tracking device on a vehicle” and 
“police need a warrant to search a cellphone that is seized during an arrest.”). 
 41 See Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 85 
U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. June 5, 2017) (No. 16–402). 
 42 See Gibson, supra note 22 (remarking that added dependence on mobile devices 
comes as Americans choose mobile phones over iPods, cameras, maps, and address books). 
 43 See Will Oremus, Forty Years Ago Today, Snarky Tech Journalists Made Fun of the 
First Cellphone, FUTURE TENSE (Apr. 3, 2013, 2:10 PM), www.slate.com/blogs/ 
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incorrect.44 
That original device, the Motorola DynaTAC, had a battery that could last up 
to eight hours.45 Jumping to 1993, Bellsouth and IBM released the “Simon 
personal communicator phone,” which was touted as the first “smartphone.”46 
In 2002, the next generation of technologically advanced smartphones was 
released into the market.47 The world’s first modern smartphone was born in 
2007 with the release of the iPhone, Apple’s venture into the mobile device 
market after previously concentrating on its Mac computers.48 In the product 
release, Apple claimed the iPhone was three devices rolled into one: an iPod, a 
mobile phone, and a wireless communication device.49 
With the dependency of Americans on mobile devices, and especially cellular 
devices, law enforcement has had to adapt and apply new approaches in response 
to the technology.50 Service providers are able to assist law enforcement in 
                                                          
future_tense/2013/04/03/cell_phones_40th_birthday_skeptics_made_fun_of_first_mobile_p
hone.html (describing how Associated Press journalists compared the release of the first cell 
phone to the fictions in television series and while cellphones were too expensive for the 
average consumer, only 13% of the American business community would have been 
interested in purchasing such a device at that time). 
 44 Cf. Gibson, supra note 22 (providing that dependence on cell phones have increased 
in society as relevance to perform daily tasks like shopping have become more prevalent); 
Smith, supra note 23. 
 45 Oremus, supra note 43. Upon releasing its product, Motorola quipped that in its 
opinion, people would continue using their car phones and cell phones would not replace 
standard telephones. See Gibson, supra note 22. 
 46 See Doug Aamoth, First Smartphone Turns 20: Fun Facts About Simon, TIME (Aug. 
18, 2014), http://time.com/3137005/first-smartphone-ibm-simon/ (describing that The 
Simon was designed as a phone first and computer second and demanded a $900 price on 
average with Bellsouth for features such as e-mail, on-screen writing (with a stylus), keypad 
with letters and numbers, and a calendar). 
 47 See 5 major moments in cellphone history, CBC NEWS, http://www.cbc.ca/news/ 
technology/5-major-moments-in-cellphone-history-1.1407352 (last updated Apr. 3, 2013) 
(providing that The Nokia 7650 and the Sanyo SPC-5300, released in 2002 had the 
distinction of being the next-generation of smartphones. These phones were the first to 
incorporate built-in cameras, boasting large pixel color displays, user-controlled tones, 
white balance, and zoom while the Nokia 7650 had a 176x208 pixel display); cf. Michael 
Grothaus, iPhone 7 vs Samsung Galaxy S7: The BIG Flagship Fight Rages On, KNOW YOUR 
MOBILE (July 19, 2017, 4:34 PM), http://www.knowyourmobile.com/mobile phones/apple-
iphone-7/23410/iphone-7-vs-samsung-galaxy-s7-edge-specs-features-price-detailed-ios-10-
android-n (showing the even more advanced features in smartphones of the largest 
competing companies); see also iPhone 7 Display, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/ 
iphone-7/specs/ (last visited Mat 24, 2018) (describing the iPhone 7’s 1334 x 750 pixel 
resolution, which makes the 2002 smartphones seem like ancient history). 
 48 5 major moments in cellphone history, supra note 47. 
 49 See id. (describing the iPhone’s advanced features, including a touch screen, visual 
voicemail box, touchpad keyboard, photo library, and a large display for watching movies or 
television). 
 50 See Van Ells, supra note 24 (quoting a North Dakota police officer as saying, “as 
2018] Privacy vs. Protection 9 
finding citizens’ whereabouts through tracking location data.51 While such 
methods of tracking suspects may not be used on a daily basis, there are times 
where such methods are used without a second thought, as is the case in tracking 
suspects of terrorism.52 Police favor mobile device tracking because it provides 
nearly instantaneous results.53 
While it may appear that law enforcement would always employ location data 
tracking methods, it is much more difficult to implement such techniques.54 The 
policies of large service providers, such as AT&T and Verizon, allow expert 
analysts to determine if a true emergency exists55 and whether to hand over 
information to police.56 Once law enforcement obtains the information, through 
either compulsion or willing participation, the information can be sent to officers 
every five, fifteen, or thirty minutes depending on the urgency of the 
investigation.57 
As the history of mobile device data, location tracking data, and Internet data 
progresses, there will be a constant balancing of public interests of privacy and 
government interests of security. One reason service providers may be reluctant 
to turn over location data is that the public—that is, their customers—sees 
mobile data as a privacy right to be protected.58  The government no longer 
                                                          
cellphones become more and more sophisticated . . . we see more and more cases where 
they’re being used in criminal attempts and criminal types of enterprises.”). 
 51 See id. (stating that in 2012, a son was arrested and charged with his mother’s murder 
and police were able to use cell phone tracking data provided by the cellular company to 
locate the son). 
 52 See id. (explaining in emergency situations, child pedophilia situations, and 
kidnapping situations tracking through cellular companies’ data is oft-used). 
 53 See id. (quoting a North Dakota police officer as saying, “[t]echnology . . . is kind of 
a double-edged sword. More crimes are able to be committed since we have this technology 
but at the same time, we’re able to investigate and successfully prosecute more cases 
because of this technology.”). 
 54 See id. (explaining that police requests may be denied if the mobile provider does not 
believe that the situation constitutes an emergency and in such instances, law enforcement 
must obtain a warrant for the data whenever possible and otherwise hope that the situation 
constitutes an emergency that convinces the mobile service provider to turn over 
information willingly). 
 55 See Blain, supra note 14 (noting these policies are not just provided by cell phone 
service providers but companies such as Amazon have denied turning over data without a 
warrant where law enforcement requested such information from an Echo). 
 56 See Van Ells, supra note 24 (providing that without a showing by police of the 
existence of a true emergency, the analyst may transfer the request for data to a director who 
is responsible for determining whether to grant the request or inform the police they need a 
subpoena because service providers guard their customers’ data information jealously, in 
part because the information can be used by law enforcement to pinpoint the exact location 
of the customer). 
 57 Id. 
 58 See Lee Rainie, The State of Privacy in Post-Snowden America, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 
21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/the-state-of-privacy-in-
america/ (finding that 74% of Americans believe it is very important they are in control of 
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enjoys the support of public opinion that allowed for more invasive security 
measures like the PATRIOT Act and other post-9/11 measures.59 The PATRIOT 
Act, which allowed the government to increase its surveillance of Americans’ 
personal mobile and Internet data, was seen as a necessary protective measure 
from future terror attacks after the tragedy of September 11, 2001.60 
C. General Information on Cell Towers and Tracking Technology 
Modern mobile devices are amazing pieces of technology, yet they cannot 
function without the aid of a cell tower.61 These towers serve as conduits for all 
mobile services, applications, and data emanating from mobile devices.62 
Service providers place towers in a hexagon pattern to increase the total service 
area and ensure that no holes in coverage exists.63 By studying data traffic across 
networks in cell tower areas, carriers can determine whether there needs to be 
                                                          
who gets their information, and 65% say it is very important that they can control what 
information is collected about them); see also Smith, supra note 23 (stating that a majority 
of Americans own smartphones, which supports the proposition that privacy of these 
Americans’ data is a major concern). 
 59 Sophia Rosenbaum, Privacy vs. Protection: Public Wrestles with What’s Most 
Important, NBC NEWS (June 6, 2013, 10:01 AM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/ 
2013/06/06/18802435-privacy-vs-protection-public-wrestles-with-whats-most-
important?lite; see The USA PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life and Liberty, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm (last visited May 24, 2018) (describing 
that the PATRIOT Act was passed in response to the 9/11 attacks). 
 60 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (2001) (describing that the PATRIOT Act allowed the government to intercept 
communications, seize voicemail messages with warrants, and modify the law relating to 
pen registers); see David W. Moore, Public Little Concerned About Patriot Act, GALLUP 
(Sept. 9, 2003), http://news.gallup.com/poll/9205/public-little-concerned-about-patriot-
act.aspx (noting that shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the public was not as concerned 
with loss of civil liberties in favor of counter-terrorism tactics and that two years later, the 
trend increased in favor of civil liberties over government interference). 
 61 Brian L. Owsley, The Fourth Amendment Implications of the Government’s Use of 
Cell Tower Dumps in Its Electronic Surveillance, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 3 (2013); see 
MICHAEL HARRIS, HOW CELL TOWERS WORK 2 (2011), http://www.unisonsite.com/pdf/ 
resource-center/How%20Towers%20Work.pdf (describing that cell towers are essentially 
elevated antennas that transmit and receive radio frequencies generated by mobile devices 
and the wires running from the antenna to cellular carrier equipment contain the mobile 
device information and wireless signals). 
 62 See Owsley, supra note 61, at 5 (describing that another purpose of the cell towers is 
to collect information for billing purposes). 
 63 Robert M. Bloom & William T. Clark, Small Cells, Big Problems: The Increasing 
Precision of Cell Site Location Information and the Need for Fourth Amendment 
Protections, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 167, 172 (2016). 
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more or fewer towers in a specific location.64 Cell towers in America run on a 
radio access network that essentially comprises of the tower connecting to all 
mobile devices in its range, the mobile devices sending data transmissions to the 
antenna, and the antenna providing those transmissions to the service provider.65 
While cell towers communicate with, and track all activities of, mobile 
devices, a system of satellites provides the devices with the ability to give users 
directions to destinations and tell them their precise location anywhere in the 
world.66 The Global Positioning System (GPS) sends radio signals from 
satellites orbiting the Earth to GPS devices that use the signals to pinpoint the 
devices’ locations on the Earth’s surface.67 This advanced system allows 
Americans to always know where they are in the world simply by enabling the 
GPS functions on their mobile devices, which will then continuously monitor 
the device’s global position.68 
Mobile devices, by communicating with cell towers and using GPS 
capabilities have the ability to be monitored and tracked by the government and 
cellular service providers.69 Cell towers receive data communications about a 
device’s activities, which are then stored in the service provider’s records.70 
                                                          
 64 See Timothy Stapleton, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Cell 
Location Data: Is the Whole More than the Sum of Its Parts, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 383, 386 
(2007) (describing that the number of cell towers is determined by how densely populated 
an area is such as rural areas have less cell towers than cities); see also HARRIS, supra note 
61, at 1–3 (describing that  modern cell towers come in varying sizes depending on the 
range required, with the largest typically covering 10 miles and the smallest covering under 
250 yards and are also more frequently being camouflaged to blend into the surrounding 
landscape so as not to be eyesores). 
 65 Justin Hill, Digital Technology and Analog Law: Cellular Location Data, the Third-
Party Doctrine, and the Law’s Need to Evolve, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 773, 777 (2017); see 
also HARRIS, supra note 61, at 3–4 (describing that these technical specifications and radio 
frequency transmissions are what people know as 3G, 4G, LTE, and other speeds that their 
mobile devices use to function). 
 66 Owen Murphy, Commonwealth v. Augustine: The Supreme Judicial Court’s 
Misapplication of Jurisprudence to Technology, 98 MASS. L. REV. 39, 41 (2017); GPS 
Overview, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/ (last visited May 24, 2018). 
 67 See How GPS Works, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/multimedia/poster/ (last visited 
May 24, 2018) (describing that once a GPS-enabled device receives the radio signal, it notes 
the exact time of arrival and uses that information to calculate the distance from the device 
to each of the system’s orbiting satellites calculates its distance from at least four satellites 
using geometry to determine its exact location on Earth). 
 68 GPS Overview, supra note 66; How GPS Works, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/ 
multimedia/poster/ (last visited May 24, 2018). 
 69 E.g., Ann O’Neill, Tsarnaev Trial: Timeline of the Bombings, Manhunt and 
Aftermath, CNN (May 15, 2015, 3:43 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/04/us/tsarnaev-
trial-timeline/index.html (describing that the police were able to track the device of the 
kidnapped student which helped to locate the path the brothers were on, and ultimately led 
to their demise); The Problem with Mobile Phones, SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE, 
https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/problem-mobile-phones (last visited May 24, 2018). 
 70 Shannon Jaeckel, Cell Phone Location Tracking: Reforming the Standard to Reflect 
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Such incredible access to information, and near constant availability of cell 
tower signals, gives Americans the ability to always have their mobile devices 
up and running; however, it also allows law enforcement to track suspects by 
way of those same devices, such as used by the Boston Police to find Dzhokhar 
Tsarnev.71 Technology can be both a boon for societal interconnection and a 
drawback for personal privacy.72 
D. Different Strategies to Mobile Device Location Data Tracking Protections 
Courts and legislatures have fallen behind the technological advancement of 
society, and have thus been attempting to play catch-up in regulating and 
protecting citizens’ rights to their technological data.73 One approach relies on 
the judicial system to determine what rights citizens have in their mobile location 
data.74 Another approach places upon legislatures the impetus to create laws and 
statutes that outline citizen rights in the information.75 Yet another approach has 
no binding authority from the courts or legislatures regarding the level of 
protection citizens can expect.76 
In the first strategy, case law has determined that no warrant is required for 
law enforcement to obtain location-tracking data from service providers.77 
Following the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 774 
(6th Cir. 2012), this strategy allows police to obtain data and signals from mobile 
devices without requiring a warrant to perform any tracking.78 Tracking location 
data in such a manner is more efficient and uses fewer resources than a massive 
                                                          
Modern Privacy Expectations, 77 LA. L. REV. 143, 144 (2016). 
 71 O’Neill, supra note 69 (describing how Boston police officers were able to track 
Tsarnaev through a phone call he made on a hostage’s mobile device, ultimately leading 
them to his location and ending the manhunt). 
 72 See Jaeckel, supra note 70; O’Neill, supra note 69. 
 73 Cell Phone Location Tracking Laws by State, supra note 25. 
 74 Jaeckel, supra note 70, at 155. 
 75 United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 512 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 76 See Cell Phone Location Tracking Laws by State, supra note 25 (providing that some 
states have yet to pass laws regarding this issue). 
 77 Id. 
 78 United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 774, 777 (6th Cir. 2012) (reasoning that if a tool 
used to transport contraband gives off a signal, and that signal’s location can be tracked, 
police can track the signal; the court analogizes that to hold otherwise would prevent dogs 
from being used to track fugitives); Catherine Crump, Appeals Court Rules Fourth 
Amendment Does Not Protect Cell Phone Location Data, ACLU (Aug. 15, 2012), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/appeals-court-rules-fourth-amendment-does-
not-protect-cell-phone-location (highlighting that jurisdictions allow law enforcement to 
achieve the same level of surveillance through GPS monitoring in minutes as would be 
achieved through physical tailing of a suspect for numerous days). 
2018] Privacy vs. Protection 13 
surveillance operation.79 Allowing warrantless tracking of mobile device 
location data is the strategy with the largest group of jurisdictions to follow 
similar policies.80 
A second approach advocates requiring a warrant for all location information 
tracking by law enforcement.81 This approach provides the highest level of 
protection to citizens’ location data through legislatively enacted laws.82 One 
example is the California Senate enacting the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act in 2015, partially to ensure that Californians were protected from 
intrusions by law enforcement into their mobile data.83 To guarantee privacy 
interests are protected, this approach allows citizens who have been targeted 
inconsistent with the law to move to suppress data information or petition for 
the destruction of the information.84 Requiring warrants for any location data 
tracking is the most common approach today, while the second most common 
approach concerns state legislatures enacting state statutes.85 
Another strategy arose where state legislatures chose to enact laws in 
harmony with, or above, federal court jurisprudence. Virginia is such a state that 
has enacted its own legislation regarding the issue of location data tracking.86 
Following the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 
421 (4th Cir. 2016), Virginia amended its state laws to weaken the protections 
afforded to individuals’ mobile data.87 Virginia’s enacted law requires service 
providers to disclose information to government entities whenever they obtain a 
warrant, subpoena, court order, or consent of the consumer; yet it also provides 
avenues for law enforcement to obtain mobile data without a warrant.88 Using 
                                                          
 79 Crump, supra note 78. 
 80 See generally Cell Phone Location Tracking Laws by State, supra note 25 (showing 
the jurisdictional differences in cell phone tracking laws). 
 81 Blain, supra note 14. 
 82 S.B. 178, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015). 
 83 Cal. Penal Code § 1546.1(a) (2017) (providing that the only ways government entities 
may compel production of electronic communication is through a warrant, wiretap order, 
electronic reader records order, or subpoena pursuant to established California law); S.B. 
178, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (prohibiting government entities from compelling 
service providers to produce electronic communication information, as well as accessing 
electronic devices physically or electronically without a valid warrant). 
 84 Cal. Penal Code § 1546.4(a) (2017). 
 85 See generally Cell Phone Location Tracking Laws by State, supra note 25 (showing 
the jurisdictional differences in cell phone tracking laws). 
 86 VA. CODE § 19.2-70.3(E) (1-4) (2017) (providing that law enforcement may obtain 
real-time location data without a warrant in certain emergencies). 
 87 United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding the government 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment by obtaining location information from a service 
provider without a warrant); VA. CODE § 19.2-70.3(E) (1-4) (2017) (providing that law 
enforcement may obtain real-time location data without a warrant in certain emergencies). 
 88 VA. CODE § 19.2-70.3(E) (1-4) (2017) (providing a warrant exception for certain 
exigent circumstances). 
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this approach, jurisdictions have amended their laws to either comply with 
guidelines handed down by the circuit courts or to provide other distinctive 
protections.89 
A contrary state-based approach advocates enacting laws that prohibit police 
from obtaining current or future location information relating to a suspected 
citizen without a warrant based on probable cause.90 This approach allows law 
enforcement agencies to obtain such information in times of emergency, with 
the consent of the device’s owner, or when available to the general public.91 This 
approach offers a hybrid scheme of policies protecting real-time location data 
by requiring warrants for data seizure by law enforcement, yet also allows law 
enforcement to obtain that information under a specified set of circumstances 
without a warrant.92 
A contrasting strategy proposes offering protections to citizens’ location data 
through the discretion of judges.93 An example of this strategy comes by way of 
the Third Circuit.94 The Third Circuit limits instances in which a government 
entity may require service providers to disclose customers’ data.95 Even though 
there is some form of protection from law enforcement’s compelling service 
providers to turn over information, no absolute protection exists since courts can 
easily choose to order disclosure without a warrant with a sufficient showing of 
government need.96 However, there are built-in protections in place that make 
disclosure orders different from a normal warrant based on probable cause; 
namely, law enforcement must meet certain requirements to convince courts to 
                                                          
 89 Id. (allowing police to obtain mobile data in certain situations without a warrant). 
 90 Freedom from Location Surveillance Act, 725 ILCS 168/1 (Ill. 2014). 
 91 VA. CODE § 19.2-70.3(E)(1-4) (2017) (permitting exceptions to the warrant 
requirement in specific emergencies); see Commonwealth v. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939, 962 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (recognizing that under the Pennsylvania Constitution, citizens do 
have legitimate expectations of privacy in their real-time location data and that tracking 
allows police to locate people inside their private dwellings, where privacy expectations are 
at the highest). 
 92 Freedom from Location Surveillance Act, 725 ILCS 168/1 (Ill. 2014). 
 93 Cell Phone Location Tracking Laws by State, supra note 25 (showing the 
jurisdictional differences in cell phone tracking laws). 
 94 In re United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commun. Serv. to 
Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
government, in order to compel production of citizens’ cell site location information, has a 
lesser burden to prove than probable cause; however, courts have the discretion to require a 
warrant prior to ordering service providers to turn over information). 
 95 Id. at 306–07 (explaining the various statutory circumstances that permit law 
enforcement to obtain cell phone data without a warrant while also distinguishing between 
the data stored on the phone and data stored remotely that the phone may access). 
 96 Id. (reasoning that there is a contradiction in the statute because warrants require 
probable cause, but there is no such burden when seeking a court order for disclosure). 
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compel disclosure without obtaining a warrant.97 This mix of protections and 
pro-law enforcement policies has only attracted a small number of 
jurisdictions.98 
Finally, in an approach that might be described as a lack of a strategy, the only 
uniting characteristic is that the jurisdiction has enacted no binding authority and 
thus defaults to the majority rule of unprotected location data.99 This approach 
simply follows the overall model that location data information from mobile 
devices is unprotected.100 Until a concrete answer is given to the question of 
warrantless tracking of location data, jurisdictions will continue to adhere to the 
current model of allowing such tracking.101 
The arguments presented above represent differing approaches for 
determining what degree of protection to afford location data.102 With differing 
strategies on the correct application of the Fourth Amendment to this issue, 
resolution will come down to either states enacting their own laws103 or federal 
courts uniting behind one common legal rule.104 However, even the federal 
courts have reached an impasse between differing approaches and resolutions to 
mobile device location data protections.105 
II. FEDERAL COURT JURISPRUDENCE AND DIFFERING OUTCOMES 
There is no recognized consensus on how to approach protection for mobile-
device location data.106 With the lack of agreement, the next step is to turn to the 
federal court system to deliver a legal rule that unites the differing approaches, 
yet that has not been forthcoming either.107 At the district court level, there is a 
                                                          
 97 Id. 
 98 See generally Crump, supra note 78 (showing the jurisdictional differences in cell 
phone tracking laws). 
 99 See generally id. (showing the jurisdictional differences in cell phone tracking laws). 
 100 See generally id. (highlighting the differences in various state’s approach to cell 
phone data privacy). 
 101 See Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 85 
U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. June 5, 2017) (No. 16–402). 
 102 Compare VA. CODE § 19.2-70.3(E) (1-4) (2017), with Freedom from Location 
Surveillance Act, 725 ILCS 168/1 (Ill. 2014), and CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a) (2017). 
 103 Compare VA. CODE § 19.2-70.3(E)(1-4) (2017), with Freedom from Location 
Surveillance Act, 725 ILCS 168/1 (Ill. 2014), and CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a) (2017). 
 104 Compare VA. CODE § 19.2-70.3(E) (1-4) (2017), with Freedom from Location 
Surveillance Act, 725 ILCS 168/1 (Ill. 2014), and CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a) (2017). See 
supra Section I.D; infra Part II. 
 105 See Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. 
June 5, 2017) (No. 16–402). 
 106 See generally Crump, supra note 78 (illustrating the differences between various 
states’ laws regarding warrantless cell phone tracking). 
 107 Compare United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 608, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(holding that the third party doctrine did not apply to cellular signals intercepted by the 
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split between courts that favor protecting location information and courts that 
favor law enforcement conducting warrantless tracking.108 Contrastingly, the 
circuit courts offer unified results.109 However, even that unity is showing signs 
of cracking.110 
A. Split District Court Decisions Further the Uncertainty Surrounding Location 
Data Rights 
On the lower end of the federal courts, there is disagreement between 
supporting law enforcement’s use of location data without obtaining a warrant 
and adamantly refusing to allow such data to be obtained without a warrant.111 
In United States v. Ledbetter, 2015 WL 7758930 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2015), the 
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio had to determine whether 
citizens are protected from having their mobile devices’ records disclosed to 
police investigating certain crimes.112 Upon analyzing the devices found in 
Ledbetter’s vehicle, police issued subpoenas to obtain the devices’ records from 
service providers in connection with multiple murder investigations.113 
                                                          
government), with United States v. Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185, 2016 WL 740246, at *1–2 
(D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2016) (denying the defendant’s motion to suppress cellular records 
obtained from via the third party doctrine), and United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-
080, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161693, at *41–42 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (holding the defendant 
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy for cellular records in the possession of a third 
party), and In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 
F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1023–24 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that the large amount of data collected 
and stored of a customer’s movement was within the reasonable expectation of privacy and 
in violation of the 4th Amendment). 
 108 Compare Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 616 (holding that the third-party doctrine did 
not apply to cellular signals intercepted by the government), with Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-
080, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161693, at *41–42 (holding the defendant lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy for cellular records in the possession of a third party). 
 109 Compare Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185, 2016 WL 740246, at *1–2, with In re 
Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 
1023–24 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 110 United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (upholding the third-
party doctrine and ruling that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy for 
information given to a third party). 
 111 Compare Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185, 2016 WL 740246, at *1–2, with In re 
Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 
1023–24. 
 112 United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-080, 2015 WL 7758930, at *41–42 (S.D. 
Ohio Dec. 2, 2015) (describing an undercover police surveillance operation where upon 
initiation of police stop the defendant only yielded after roughly one-tenth of a mile giving 
probable cause to police to search and find $5,500 in cash, a small amount of marijuana, 
three grams of cocaine, eight grams of marijuana, a 9mm handgun, $51,302 in cash, and five 
mobile devices). 
 113 See United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-080, 2015 WL 7758930, at *1 (S.D. 
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Ultimately, the court held that Ledbetter lacked a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the records on the mobile devices obtained by law enforcement.114 
Agreement soon came from the District of Connecticut in United States v. 
Chavez, 2016 WL 740246 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2016).115 In Chavez, the issue was 
whether a magistrate judge’s order to compel Verizon to disclose Chavez’s 
location data was an unconstitutional search and seizure.116 The court found that 
there was no Fourth Amendment violation of the search and seizure principle 
because the third-party doctrine applied.117 The third-party doctrine states 
persons do not have reasonable expectations of privacy in their phone 
conversations with others because the other party is free to reveal the contents 
of the conversation to police.118 Applying the rule of law found in the third-party 
doctrine, the court held that it was irrelevant that a suspect disclosed information 
while in the privacy of the home and that disclosure reveals something the user 
said or did in the home.119 The court also found no need to suppress the obtained 
information because there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment or the 
Stored Communication Act.120 
A case on the opposite end of the protection spectrum is In re Application for 
Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 
1011 (N.D. Cal. 2015).121 The Northern District of California, like California in 
                                                          
Ohio Dec. 2, 2015) (challenging the subpoenas contending that without valid search 
warrants, “the police were not entitled to obtain those records because they might contain 
historical cell-site location information.”). 
 114 United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-080, 2015 WL 7758930, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 
Dec. 2, 2015) (holding that suppression is not a remedy that is available for a violation of 
the Stored Communications Act, and for that additional reason his motions to suppress 
failed). 
 115 United States v. Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185, 2016 WL 740246, at *1 (D. Conn. Feb. 
24, 2016). 
 116 Id. (stating that the government obtained Chavez’s data records through a valid order 
because the reasons stated in the application were seen to satisfy probable cause). 
 117 United States v. Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185, 2016 WL 740246, at *2 (D. Conn. Feb. 
24, 2016) (defining the third-party doctrine as, “a person does not have a right or interest 
that is protected under the Fourth Amendment to prevent the Government from obtaining 
information about a person that is in the custody of a third party and including information 
that the person has voluntarily disclosed to a third party.”). 
 118 THOMPSON, supra note 11, at 7–9 (stating that when parties are invited to the 
conversation or accept the use of devices, any person who has the information or is party to 
that agreement may report to the authorities). 
 119 See Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185, 2016 WL 740246, at *1 (holding a customer’s 
preferences or wishes are not a controlling consideration for determining whether 
information has been voluntarily given under the third-party doctrine). 
 120 Id. at *4. 
 121 In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. 
Supp. 3d 1011, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
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general,122 came down in favor of individual rights to location data.123 The court 
gave a thorough analysis on mobile device information, often called “historical 
cell site location information” (CSLI).124 CSLI includes the exact location of the 
service provider’s tower that serves the mobile device’s call, text, or data 
transfer.125 With the precise nature of base stations, it is now possible to know a 
device’s location to within a relatively small geolocation.126 Analyzing the 
government’s request for CSLI for a sixty-day retroactive period, the court found 
that mobile devices clearly qualify as “effects” under the Fourth Amendment.127 
Under that premise, the court ultimately held that individuals have an 
expectation of privacy in CSLI associated with their mobile devices.128 Since the 
individual’s privacy interest was reasonable and protected by society, the court 
ruled that the government must obtain a warrant for any CSLI data.129 
Finally, mere months after Chavez was decided, the Southern District of New 
York held that to track location data a warrant must be received, with the scope 
                                                          
 122 See DeMassa v. Nunez, 770 F.2d 1505, 1506 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy against searches of their attorney’s office 
under the Fourth Amendment). 
 123 See In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 
F. Supp. 3d at 1013. 
(holding that users’ expectations of privacy in location information associated with cellular 
devices were reasonable). 
 124 See id. at 1013–14 (discussing how mobile device data is sent and received, and how 
it can be monitored by service providers and the government, and discussing that to 
facilitate better mobile device use, service providers maintain a network of radio base 
stations (cell towers) with varying coverage areas). 
 125 See id. at 1014 (stating how a special agent from the FBI informed the court that 
CSLI can be generated in the absence of any user interaction with the mobile device). Many 
modern devices have applications that continuously run in the background, generating a 
constant stream of incoming and outgoing data and additional testimony revealed that a 
mobile device that is turned on will “ping” the nearest cell tower every seven to nine 
minutes, and service providers keep track of CSLI generated in such fashion. See id. 
 126 See id. at 1015 (stating that at times the location can be so accurate that service 
providers can identify individual floors and rooms within buildings). 
 127 See id. at 1019 (citing the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of the right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, homes, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures). 
 128 See In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 
F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1022–23 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (applying the following three principles: “(1) 
an individual’s expectation of privacy is at its pinnacle when government surveillance 
intrudes on the home; (2) long-term electronic surveillance . . . implicates an individual’s 
expectation of privacy; and (3) location data generated by cell phones . . . can reveal a 
wealth of private information about an individual.”). 
 129 See In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 
F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1023, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding that since CSLI, like GPS, can 
provide a comprehensive record of a person’s movements and individual preferences, 
protection was warranted, and the government has to obtain a search warrant before 
compelling disclosure of CSLI and location information from service providers). 
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of the tracking limited to only those records specifically requested.130 In United 
States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), the issue was whether 
the use of a cell-site simulator, a device that mimics cell tower frequencies, 
constituted an unreasonable search prohibited under the Fourth Amendment.131 
The court found that use of such a device was an unreasonable search because 
the forced “pings,” a ping being each time a device connects to a cell tower,132 
constituted technology not available to the public.133 Additionally, the simulator 
gave the DEA details of the home constituting a physical intrusion.134 
Ultimately, the court found that the “pings” picked up by the simulator were 
forced transmissions of electronic data identifying the phone’s exact location 
until the DEA found the apartment.135 
The district court decisions above show disagreement over the applicability 
of the third-party doctrine to location information tracking cases.136 They also 
show disagreement over whether mobile devices and data information are 
protected.137 Interestingly, the district courts siding with law enforcement are 
usually from jurisdictions in which the circuit court has ruled in favor of 
warrantless tracking, whereas courts not in those jurisdictions have held the 
opposite. 
B. United States Circuit Court Opinions 
Unlike the disagreement at the district court level, circuit courts currently 
agree that there is no constitutional requirement for law enforcement to obtain a 
warrant to gather location data from service providers.138 In the first circuit 
                                                          
 130 United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 611, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 131 Id. at 610 (distinguishing between CSLI and “ping” data by describing CSLI as the 
aggregate data that is obtained by cell towers, including general location, device usage, and 
numbers dialed while “pings” on the other hand are a means by which the police force the 
mobile device to emit a data signal to pinpoint location). 
 132 Id. at 609. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 610-11 (holding, in a direct divergence from its sister court in Connecticut, that 
without a search warrant, the government cannot turn citizens’ mobile devices into tracking 
instruments). 
 135 Id. at 615–16 (holding the forced pings violate the Fourth Amendment’s search 
protection because they are outside the normal operation of the mobile device). 
 136 In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. 
Supp. 3d 1011, 1023, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2015); United States v. Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185, 
2016 WL 740246, at *2 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2016). 
 137 United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-080, 2015 WL 7758930, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 
Dec. 2, 2015). See generally In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal 
Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1019–20 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 138 United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 781 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358–59 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500 
(11th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
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decision on this issue, the Sixth Circuit had to determine whether the 
government’s use of real-time location tracking of two phones belonging to the 
defendant constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment.139 The court stated 
that when criminals use modern technological devices to carry out criminal acts, 
they cannot complain when law enforcement uses those same devices to 
apprehend them.140 
It held that when a tool being used to transport contraband gives off location 
data signals, the law does not prevent police from tracking those signals.141 
Similarly, there is no difference between physically trailing a suspect and 
tracking the suspect through technological means.142 The government 
strengthened its case by obtaining multiple orders to compel the disclosure of 
GPS location information from Skinner’s phones.143 Ultimately, Skinner had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his location data and records suppression 
was not warranted.144 
Two years after Skinner, the Fifth Circuit decided United States v. Guerrero, 
768 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2014).145 On the relevant CSLI and cell towers facts, the 
court focused on the third-party doctrine and the Stored Communications Act.146 
                                                          
 139 See Skinner, 690 F.3d at 774–76 (showing how the communications between two 
phones belonging to the leader of the smuggling ring identified the defendant allowing law 
enforcement to obtain new orders to compel the phones’ service provider to disclose 
subscriber information, CSLI, GPS real-time location, and “ping” data from the phones 
which in turn allowed law enforcement to track defendant’s movements throughout Texas 
without any visual or physical surveillance). 
 140 Id. at 774 (reasoning that Skinner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the data 
being transmitted from his mobile device). 
 141 Id. at 777 (reasoning that the law “cannot be that a criminal is entitled to rely on the 
expected untrackability [sic] of his tools.”). 
 142 See id. at 778 (stating that law enforcement must be allowed to adapt its tactics to 
modern technology in order to prevent criminals from taking advantage of the criminal 
justice system). 
 143 Id. at 779. 
 144 Id. at 781 (reasoning that no physical intrusion occurred because defendant obtained 
the mobile devices for the purpose of communication, and GPS capabilities are included in a 
phone’s function and elaborating that since authorities tracked a known cellular number, 
which was voluntarily used during travel on public roads, the GPS location information was 
public knowledge). 
 145 United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2014) (describing how CSLI 
was introduced at trial regarding five phone calls made on the afternoon of a murder, and 
the location information was used by law enforcement to put defendant at the scene of the 
crime). 
 146 See id. at 358 (reasoning that data revealing the cell tower and sector to which the 
mobile device sent its signals was only available from third-party service providers). The 
SCA requires service providers to maintain records of transmissions and communications 
made by devices on their networks and prohibits the government from obtaining that 
information without following certain procedures outlined in statute. Id. 
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It found the government in violation of the procedures outlined in the SCA,147 
yet determined that suppressing the information was not appropriate; for 
suppression to be granted, Guerrero would need to show the CSLI was obtained 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.148 
With regard to the Fourth Amendment, the court restated that mobile-device 
users voluntarily convey information to service providers, knowing that the 
service providers record location information.149 Since users have implied 
recognition that their information is recorded to the same extent that landline 
users understand numbers dialed are recorded, the court held that expectations 
of privacy were unreasonable.150 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit determined there 
was no Fourth Amendment violation and no reason to suppress the CSLI.151 
Shortly after Guerrero, the Eleventh Circuit heard the case of United States 
v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015), and was faced with the question of 
whether a court order authorized by the SCA to compel production of records 
pertaining to CSLI violated Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights.152 The court 
relied on the third-party doctrine and an unreasonable belief in the right to 
location information privacy to deny the motion to suppress CSLI records.153 It 
found that the cell tower records and CSLI belonged to MetroPCS, were stored 
in electronic form in MetroPCS servers, and were stored by it as a third-party, 
thereby preventing Davis from having any interest in the records’ ownership.154 
Therefore, the court held the government obtained a valid court order to compel 
production of the service provider’s records and even if production constituted 
a search, obtaining records without a warrant was reasonable.155 
These circuits have been the battleground for challenges to police use of 
location data obtained by means of warrantless compulsion of service providers 
to disclose records.156 They are a small, but united, portion of the federal circuit 
                                                          
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 See id. (explaining the court’s determination for not requiring the grant of a motion to 
suppress because the government’s violation of the Stored Communications Act did not 
amount to a Fourth Amendment violation). 
 152 See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500, 502 (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining a 
case where the government produced telephone records obtained through court order from 
MetroPCS, showing all the information from cellphone towers those calls were “pinged” 
off). 
 153 See id. at 511 (reasoning that Davis could not assert ownership or possession over the 
business records sought to be suppressed). 
 154 See id. (holding that Davis had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the business 
records because users are aware that their phones do not work when they are outside the 
service provider’s cell tower network). 
 155 Id. at 509. 
 156 Id. at 502; United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining a 
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courts. However, no circuit to rule on this issue controls a jurisdiction in which 
a district court has ruled in favor of a user’s right to location data.157 
C. The Fourth Circuit Anomaly 
In an interesting twist of jurisprudence, the Fourth Circuit became the first 
federal court of appeals to rule in favor of a citizen’s right to privacy in location 
data.158 However, in an en banc rehearing it promptly reversed the earlier 
decision in favor of the individual.159 This case offers an analysis of how 
undecided circuits may come to disagree with their sister circuits in the future 
based on individual cases’ fact patterns. 
The facts presented to the Fourth Circuit in the two Graham cases remained 
the same.160 Aaron Graham and Eric Jordan were implicated in a string of 
robberies perpetrated in Baltimore County, Maryland and police obtained 
warrants for items found on the men or in their residences.161 However, the 
government only obtained warrants for the physical mobile devices, and later 
sought to compel the devices’ service providers to disclose CSLI pertaining to 
text messages and call records.162 The Fourth Circuit determined that the 
government’s obtaining the CSLI was an unreasonable search in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.163 It reasoned that users of mobile devices have an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the information their devices 
transmit.164 Yet the ruling was not a complete win for mobile device users 
because the court affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motions 
to suppress because the government acted in good faith in obtaining the 
                                                          
scenario where the acquirement of information without a search warrant does not violate 
Fourth Amendment rights); United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 157 Davis, 785 F.3d at 500, 502; Guerrero, 768 F.3d at 358; Skinner, 690 F.3d at 775. 
 158 See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 349 (4th Cir. 2015) (recognizing the 
court’s own originality in Fourth Amendment privacy). 
 159 Graham, 824 F.3d at 424. 
 160 Graham, 796 F.3d at 342; see also Graham, 824 F.3d at 424 (showing similar 
holdings that were consistent to the two Graham cases). 
 161 See Graham, 796 F.3d at 338. 
 162 See id. at 341 (explaining how the government sought two court orders for disclosure 
of CSLI relating to calls and text messages for a 221-day span even after wireless services’ 
initial denials). 
 163 Id. at 343–45 (reasoning that absent subscriber notice and consent, the government 
must secure a warrant or court order for the individual’s records after defining search 
“within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs where the government invades a 
matter in which a person has an expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as 
reasonable.”). 
 164 See id. at 345 (holding that inspection of such information by the government 
requires a warrant unless one of the few established exceptions to the warrant requirement 
apply). 
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information.165 
Upon an en banc rehearing, the entire panel of the Fourth Circuit held that the 
government did not violate the Fourth Amendment by obtaining CSLI from 
mobile devices without a warrant.166 Unlike the earlier decision, the en banc 
panel determined that the third-party doctrine applied to this case.167 Under the 
third-party doctrine, the court reasoned that the defendants had no legitimate 
expectation of privacy to information voluntarily turned over to a third party.168 
The now-united stance of circuits, compared to the disagreeing stance of 
district courts, shows that the debate over whether law enforcement may obtain 
location data without a warrant should be settled by the Supreme Court.169 
Clearer guidance from the Supreme Court would bring a sense of finality to the 
issue, or at least allow for a more uniform application of law. However, 
achieving a bright-line ruling from the Court may prove to be more challenging 
than expected.170 
III. CLOSE, BUT NOT EXACT: PAST SUPREME COURT CASES 
DEALING WITH GPS TRACKING AND USE OF PHONE CONTENTS 
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of 
mobile device location data.171 However, the Court has taken cases dealing with 
major surveillance and technological issues in the past.172 Since its first 
landmark technology surveillance decision in 1979,173 the Supreme Court has 
slowly waded through the uncharted waters of modern technology, privacy 
expectations, and police’s responses to technological advances.174 
                                                          
 165 See id. at 362 (finding that the government relied on the Stored Communications Act 
and two court orders in obtaining the CSLI from service providers and recognizing that 
citizens have an inherently reasonable expectation to the privacy of their mobile 
communications, but that the government can overcome that expectation if it relies in good 
faith on statutes or court orders). 
 166 See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 167 See id. at 425 (holding that the third-party doctrine applies even when the information 
is revealed to a third party “on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose 
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”). 
 168 See id. (showing that since the government acquired the records from the service 
providers in the normal course of business, and did not view, listen to, record, or engage in 
direct surveillance of defendants to obtain the information, there was no constitutional 
violation). 
 169 Id. 
 170 See infra Part III. 
 171 See infra Sections III.A-E. 
 172 See infra Sections III.A-E. 
 173 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (“The installation and use 
of a pen register, consequently, was not a ‘search,’ and no warrant was required.”). 
 174 See also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323 (1987) (holding that a mere recording 
of serial numbers of stereo equipment in plain view does not constitute a “seizure”); City of 
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A. Smith v. Maryland: Acceptable Surveillance when Risk is Assumed 
The first landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court came in 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).175 This case set the tone that 
surveillance is acceptable, especially when the person assumes the risk that 
information could be given to police.176 The facts of Smith are simple; a man 
driving a 1975 Monte Carlo robbed Patricia McDonough in Baltimore, 
Maryland and shortly after, McDonough began receiving phone calls from the 
robber  and one day saw the Monte Carlo slowly driving past her front porch.177 
Police had the telephone company install a pen register at its office to monitor 
the calls being dialed from Smith’s phone.178 After installing the pen register, 
without a warrant, police learned that Smith dialed McDonough’s home phone 
on several occasions.179 
The Supreme Court stated that application of the Fourth Amendment 
depended upon whether an individual could claim a justifiable, reasonable, or 
legitimate expectation of privacy that had been invaded by government action.180 
The Court found that with the pen register installed on telephone company 
property, Smith had no claim that his property was invaded.181Additionally, 
Smith had no expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from his home 
phone.182 
The Court stated that even if individuals expect some level of privacy in the 
                                                          
Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 764–65 (2010); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 945, 948 
(2010); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (2014). 
 175 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46 (holding the use of a pen register by a telephone 
company does not constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).  
 176 See id. at 745; see also LaChance, supra note 8. 
 177 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737 (describing a scenario where police found a man matching the 
description given to them by McDonough in her general neighborhood, who was driving a 
1975 Monte Carlo). 
 178 Id. at 736 (explaining a pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers 
dialed on a telephone; it does not record conversations or completed calls, only the numbers 
dialed into the phone). 
 179 Id. at 740 (explaining a scene where the police then received a warrant to search 
Smith’s home, which revealed a telephone book with McDonough’s page folded 
downwards). 
 180 Id. at 740 (presenting the new analysis into two questions: first, whether the 
individual has shown he sought to preserve something as private, and second, whether the 
individual’s expectation of privacy was justifiable under the circumstances). 
 181 Id. at 741 (reasoning that the pen register differed from a listening device, because 
pen registers cannot record contents of communications per court findings in previous cases; 
pen registers “disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed . . . Neither the 
purport of any communication between the caller and the recipient of the call . . . is 
disclosed by pen registers.”). 
 182 Id. at 742 (reasoning that all telephone users realize they must give phone numbers to 
the telephone company to complete the desired call). 
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numbers they dial, society is not prepared to recognize such expectations as 
reasonable.183 Even with some expectation of privacy, it is not legitimate and 
does not satisfy the test for a “search.”184 This early landmark decision paved 
the way for future Supreme Court cases dealing with surveillance.185 
B. Arizona v. Hicks: Seizing an Object Must Be Based on a Standard Similar to 
that of a Warrant 
Eight years after Smith, the Court weighed the interests of the public against 
the individual’s expectations of privacy, with a heavy emphasis on not depriving 
citizens of their liberty from unreasonable government searches.186 Arizona v. 
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)  did not involve the use of mobile devices, but it has 
been instrumental in formulating the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence in the almost thirty years since it was handed down.187 Justice 
Antonin Scalia presented an analytical and thorough dissection of the case in 
accord with the Fourth Amendment.188 Justice Scalia stated that taking action 
unrelated to the objectives of the authorized entry into the apartment, which 
revealed new portions of the apartment’s contents, produced a new invasion of 
privacy unjustified by the original circumstances validating the entry.189 
Turning to the reasonableness of the search, the Court bluntly stated there 
would be no doubt the search would be covered under the “plain view” doctrine 
if the officers had probable cause to believe that the equipment was stolen.190 
Yet, a lack of probable cause turned this into a case of first impression for the 
Court.191 Ultimately, it held that probable cause is required, thereby requiring a 
standard as high as that of obtaining a warrant.192 The Court made sure to 
                                                          
 183 Id. at 743–44 (arguing that because society was not willing to recognize this privacy 
right, there is a presumption against its reasonableness; therefore, Smith assumed the risk 
that the telephone company would reveal to police any numbers he dialed). 
 184 Id. at 745–46. 
 185 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 186 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) (holding that there is nothing new in 
the realization that the Constitution may sometimes insulate the criminal acts of a few to 
protect the privacy interests of the majority). 
 187 LaChance, supra note 8. 
 188 See, e.g., Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323–25. 
 189 See, e.g., id. at 325 (“A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but 
the bottom of a turntable.”). 
 190 See, e.g., id. at 323–25 (explaining that the State conceded that the officers involved 
in the entry of the apartment had only a reasonable suspicion, meaning that it was less than 
probable cause). 
 191 See, e.g., id. (arguing that the Court had never ruled on the question of whether 
probable cause is required to invoke the “plain view” doctrine; in fact, earlier Court 
decisions had explicitly mentioned that the issue was unresolved). 
 192 See, e.g., id. at 326 (highlighting that dispensing of the need for police to obtain a 
warrant is not the same as settling for a lesser standard than a warrant would require). 
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reinforce the point that just because an object can be seized without a warrant 
does not mean that it may be seized without probable cause, the same standard 
for obtaining court-authorized warrants.193 
C. City of Ontario v. Quon: Work-Related Mobile Devices and Diminished 
Privacy Expectations 
Following a lull in location-tracking jurisprudence, the Supreme Court 
decided City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).194 Quon focused on 
whether an employer has the right in certain circumstances to read the text 
messages sent and received from company-owned mobile devices.195 Jeff Quon, 
a SWAT team member for the City of Ontario, California, was issued a pager 
capable of sending and receiving text messages.196 With officers exceeding 
imposed limits, the police looked into whether officers were using the devices 
for non-work-related purposes.197 
The Supreme Court had to determine whether an unreasonable search under 
the Fourth Amendment occurred, and importantly, whether individuals have a 
reasonable privacy interest in their mobile device data.198 It found that the police 
department made clear from the beginning that the mobile devices were not 
considered private, their messages were subject to audits, and they were to be 
used solely for work-related purposes.199 Yet, Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
advocated caution and refrained from issuing a sweeping decision.200 
Accordingly, such decisions must be made in light of the expectation of privacy 
                                                          
 193 See, e.g., id. at 323–25 (reasoning that the mere fact that an object came within an 
officer’s plain view does not, by itself, do away with the requirement of probable cause or a 
warrant). 
 194 City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 750 (2010). 
 195 Id. 
 196 See id. at 751 (demonstrating how the Ontario Police Department held a meeting 
where it was explained that the messages sent on the pages were considered e-mail and were 
eligible for auditing by the City). 
 197 See id. at 752 (showing that due to Quon’s excessive overage each month, the police 
department asked Arch Wireless to provide it with transcripts of his messages sent and 
received). 
 198 See id. at 766–67 (holding that the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
because the audit was ordered to determine the result of the character limits while 
determining that the search was not reasonable in its scope, and that there were other means 
to go about the search that were less intrusive). 
 199 Id. 
 200 See id. at 759 (“The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth 
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become 
clear” because “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of communication and information 
transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as 
proper behavior.”). 
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society places upon the use of such technology and, as of Quon, there was no 
satisfactory gauge of society’s attitude to issue a broad opinion.201 
The Court found that Quon did have a reasonable, but minimal, expectation 
of privacy in his text messages.202 As a police officer, he should have known his 
actions and work-related communications were subject to scrutiny.203 In 
determining the reasonableness of the search, the Court stated that even though 
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, specifically established exceptions 
exist.204 Ultimately, the search was found to be motivated by legitimate work-
related purposes, limited in scope, and reasonable under precedent, thereby 
making it constitutional.205 This decision was one of the last significant 
developments in mobile device surveillance that did not deal with GPS and 
location-specific tracking of enabled smart devices.206 
D. United States v. Jones: Tracking of Citizens’ Vehicles by Means of GPS is 
a No-Go 
Delving deeper into technology and the GPS capabilities of modern devices, 
the Court issued a landmark ruling in 2012 that protected individuals’ rights to 
privacy of their vehicles and against searches.207 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 
400 (2010), is a rare unanimous opinion for a major issue case.208 It marks the 
first time that the Court ruled against the government and police on a major 
tracking decision.209 Antoine Jones owned a nightclub and was under 
                                                          
 201 See id. at 758–60 (opining how it was not known whether society expressed a greater 
expectation of privacy because of self-identification and ubiquity of mobile device usage, or 
whether the devices had become so mainstream that employees could purchase their own if 
they did not want their employers to search the content). 
 202 See id. at 760 (highlighting that while Quon may have had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the text messages, the police department did not necessarily violate his Fourth 
Amendment rights by obtaining and reviewing the records). 
 203 See id. at 760 (holding that even if Quon could assume some level of privacy, it was 
not reasonable to believe that the text messages were immune from scrutiny under all 
circumstances). 
 204 See id. (describing one such exception is the “special needs” of the workplace to 
justify employers searching company-owned devices). 
 205 See generally Suuberg, supra note 12 (noting that for over two decades of decisions, 
only 20% of Supreme Court opinions on criminal procedure matters have individual rights 
trumping government interests and expressing that needs for law enforcement appears to 
persuade the Court more than any other governmental interest). 
 206 City of Ontario v. Quon, EPIC.ORG, https://epic.org/privacy/quon/ (last visited May 
24, 2018) (outlining the case as one of workers’ employment privacy rights, not necessarily 
one of electronic rights in location). 
 207 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012) (ruling that individuals have a 
reasonable expectation in privacy in vehicles). 
 208 See generally id. 
 209 See id. (deciding whether attaching a GPS device to a citizen’s vehicle and 
subsequently using the device to monitor the vehicle’s movements constituted a search). 
28 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 26.2 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
investigation by the FBI and District of Columbia Police for trafficking 
narcotics.210 The police obtained a warrant to install a GPS device on Jones’s car 
within ten days and within the District of Columbia.211 However, the police did 
not install the device until the eleventh day, and it was installed in Maryland.212 
Using the device attached to Jones’s car, the government was able to record 
his movements to within fifty feet, all of which was relayed to government 
computers.213 On appeal of his conviction, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the admission of evidence obtained 
through warrantless use of GPS tracking violated the Fourth Amendment.214 The 
Supreme Court, after granting certiorari, found that the government physically 
occupied private property for the sole purpose of obtaining information, which 
would have been considered a search under the Fourth Amendment when it was 
originally adopted.215 The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the D.C. Circuit 
in favor of Jones because the warrantless encroachment on property was 
unreasonable and unconstitutional.216 Jones, and the Court’s decision in Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), are the basis for much of the current debate 
on location data tracking and whether police need to obtain warrants for such 
information. 
E. Riley v. California: Mobile Devices Are Much More than Mere Wireless 
Telephones 
The most recent decision on warrantless location data tracking struck a blow 
                                                          
 210 See id. at 402 (describing how the joint task force employed different techniques to 
watch Jones, including visual surveillance, installing cameras to watch the nightclub, and 
adding a pen register and wiretap on Jones’s cell phone). 
 211 Jones, 565 U.S. at 402–03. 
 212 See id. (2012) (explaining how the government tracked the car of the defendant for 
the twenty-eight days, and the ensuing information produced over 2,000 pages of data). 
 213 See id. at 403–04 (demonstrating that during Jones’s first trial, the district court 
granted a suppression motion for the data relating to the times the vehicle was at Jones’s 
residence and parked in his garage but admitted all data as to when the vehicle was traveling 
on public roads while during a second trial, the government admitted the entirety of the 
tracking data, and a guilty conviction was rendered, placing Jones in prison for life). 
 214 Id. 
 215 See id. at 408 (reasoning that the text of the Fourth Amendment reflects a close 
connection to property, defining a reasonable expectation of privacy as, “an expectation 
‘that has a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real 
or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by 
society.’”). 
 216 See id. at 412 (finding that the attachment of GPS tracking devices to vehicles, and 
the subsequent tracking of the vehicle’s movements, constituted an unconstitutional search 
under the Fourth Amendment). 
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to law enforcement and gave a win to privacy advocates.217 Riley v. California 
revolved around the traffic stop of David Riley and culminated in the seizure of 
his mobile-device.218 The issue arose from the officer’s actions at the scene of 
the arrest, and later at the police station, of accessing information on Riley’s 
phone without a warrant.219 With the information, Riley was convicted of firing 
into an occupied vehicle, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and attempted 
murder, which carried enhanced penalties of fifteen years to life in prison.220 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion of the Court, in which seven Justices 
joined, and one Justice entered a concurring opinion.221 Chief Justice Roberts 
began by stating that, “[o]ur cases have determined that ‘[w]here a search is 
undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal 
wrongdoing . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial 
warrant.’”222 That reiteration of clearly established law was followed by the 
mandate that in the absence of a warrant, searches are only reasonable if they 
fall within one of the specifically recognized exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.223 The question that the Court sought to resolve was whether the 
search incident to arrest doctrine applies to information stored on modern mobile 
devices.224 Noting that there was little guidance from earlier Court 
jurisprudence, the standard for determining whether to exempt a search from the 
warrant requirement lies in a balancing test.225 
                                                          
 217 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014); LaChance, supra note 8. 
02/29/468609371/at-supreme-court-debate-over-phone-privacy-has-a-long-history (citing 
Jones and Riley as the latest in succession of cases on expectation of privacy). 
 218 See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480 (holding that an individual has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a mobile phone). 
 219 See, e.g., id. at 2480–81 (describing how the officers at the scene accessed 
information on the device that identified other members of the “Bloods” gang, contact lists, 
and text messages when a detective who specialized in gangs explicitly examined files that 
“caught his eye” such as videos, photographs, and messages relating to possible gang 
activity). 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. at 2481. 
 222 See, e.g., id. at 2482. 
 223 Id. at 2494; see United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding that a 
suspect arrested for driving with a revoked license could be searched incident to arrest); 
Evans v. Solomon, 681 F. Supp. 2d 233, 248-49 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that a search of a 
suspect stopped for a traffic violation was legitimate because probable cause to arrest 
existed at the time of the search and the search was valid as a search incident to arrest); see 
also Drew Liming, Calling for a Standard: Why Courts Should Apply a New Balancing Test 
in Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 715, 729 (2014) (discussing 
officer’s search of your cell phone would frequently be permitted under the search incident 
to arrest exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment). 
 224 See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (noting the Court made the point that modern 
mobile devices are a pervasive and insistent part of Americans’ daily lives). 
 225 See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (noting the balancing test employed assesses “on 
the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, 
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After a lengthy consideration of the balance between individual privacy 
interests and the government’s interest in protecting society, the Court held that 
officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting a search like in 
Riley.226 In regards to the search incident to arrest exception, the Chief Justice 
Roberts recognized its validity and that it rests both on the heightened 
governmental interests at stake as well as on the arrestee’s reduced privacy 
interests once in custody.227 However, with the advent of modern mobile devices 
such as cell phones, privacy concerns implicated are far beyond those of the 
traditional wallet, cigarette pack, or purse.228 
The opinion then moved on to a general description of the difference between 
mobile devices and traditional objects normally kept on an arrested person’s 
body.229 Many cell phones are in fact minicomputers, cameras, video players, 
calendars, recorders, libraries, and maps.230 Additionally, storage capabilities of 
modern mobile devices have several important consequences for individual’s 
privacy interests.231 Like previous courts, the Supreme Court touched on CSLI, 
but to a much different effect. It recognized that CSLI is a standard feature on 
modern mobile devices, often able to track a person’s movements down to 
specific locations and the exact time data was collected, all of which warrant 
some level of privacy protection.232 Consequently, the Court explained that a 
search of a mobile device in today’s age reveals much more to the government 
than a traditional search of a house because the device contains the digital form 
                                                          
the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”). 
 226 See, e.g., id. at 2493; cf. Liming, supra note 223, at 729 (contending that balancing 
tests weigh legitimate interests of both law enforcement and suspected citizens; additionally, 
bright-line rules do not give courts enough flexibility to respond to new developments in 
technology). 
 227 See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488 (reiterating that law enforcement officers are still 
free to examine the physical aspects of a phone in order to ensure that it cannot be used as a 
weapon, yet the interest of protecting officers from harmful objects does not justify 
dispensing with the warrant requirement in totality). 
 228 See, e.g., id. at 2488–89 (stressing that while searches of arrested persons’ pockets for 
physical items implicate privacy interests, it is not coextensive to that of digital data). 
 229 See, e.g., id. at 2489. 
 230 See, e.g., id. 
 231 See, e.g., id. at 2489–90 (illustrating that (1) mobile devices collect many distinct 
types of information in one place that reveals much more than any isolated record, such as 
addresses, notes, prescriptions, bank statements, and videos; (2) the devices’ capacities 
allow one piece of information to convey far more than previous devices were capable of, 
through photographs with dates, locations, and descriptions; and (3) data on devices can 
date to the purchase of the device, which could potentially include months’ worth of data on 
one conversation, and fourth, unlike physical records, mobile devices have an element of 
pervasiveness that makes it possible to carry on one’s person a cache of sensitive personal 
information on a daily basis). 
 232 See, e.g., id. at 2490 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414 (2012)). 
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of sensitive records that would be found in a home, as well as private information 
that is never kept in a home.233 
The Court recognized that the data stored on these devices can contain 
incriminating information regardless of when the crime occurred.234 
Additionally, call logs on mobile devices can include information that identifies 
other individuals or special names that the owner might give to loved ones.235 
Finally, the Court admitted its decision will undoubtedly impact the ability of 
law enforcement to combat crime, yet it rationalizes that consequence by the fact 
that privacy comes at a cost.236 In its final ruling, the Court made sure to state 
that mobile device data is not always immune, only that warrants are generally 
required for police to obtain the information contained in these devices.237 From 
such a lengthy and detailed analysis of mobile-device usage and data 
information contained therein, the Court came to a rather simple holding: when 
police seize a mobile-device incident to arrest, they must obtain a warrant before 
searching the device.238 
Background material and legal jurisprudence show that strong opinions by 
district courts on both sides of the issue exist.239 Circuit courts have formed a 
united front on the pro-law enforcement side.240 Even Supreme Court case law 
                                                          
 233 See, e.g., id. at 2491 (distinguishing between data that is stored on the device itself 
and data which is stored in remote servers such as “cloud computing” and service provider 
servers). 
 234 See, e.g., id. at 2492 (reasoning that devices will contain location data or texting data 
that is indicative of past crimes or illegal acts that were never contemplated by police when 
performing a simple traffic stop or citation). 
 235 See, e.g., id. at 2493. 
 236 See id. at 2493–94 (noting Chief Justice Roberts discussion on how mobile devices 
have become important tools in the coordination of criminal enterprises and can provide 
incriminating information about criminals to police and about how these devices are so 
pervasive in society that to allow for their search without a warrant or an exception to the 
warrant requirement would subject the vast majority of innocent citizens to unconstitutional 
searches). 
 237 See, e.g., id. at 2493. 
 238 See, e.g., id. at 2495. 
 239 United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-080, 2015 WL 7758930, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 
Dec. 2, 2015) (discussing the motion to suppress all evidence seized as a result of a traffic 
stop on December 18, 2007, as well as various cell phone records obtained without search 
warrants); United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 608, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (discussing 
the DEA’s use of the cell-site simulator to locate Lambis’s apartment was an unreasonable 
search); In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. 
Supp. 3d 1013, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (concluding that cell phone users have an expectation 
of privacy in the historical CSLI associated with their cell phones, and that society is 
prepared to recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable); United States v. Chavez, 
No. 3:14-cr-00185, 2016 WL 740246, at *2 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2016) (concluding that the 
Government’s acquisition of this information was neither a “search” nor “seizure” that is 
subject to the requirements of the Fourth). 
 240 See, e.g., United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 2014); United States 
v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 774, 777 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 500, 518 
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does not set a clear precedent to follow.241 With such opinions on whether law 
enforcement can compel mobile device location data to be turned over without 
a warrant, the Court must settle the dispute with a clear, precedential decision. 
IV. WARRANTLESS USE OF MOBILE LOCATION TRACKING DATA IS 
A SEARCH . . . SOMETIMES: CREATING AN EXCEPTION TO THE 
WARRANT REQUIREMENT THROUGH AN ADAPTED TEST 
With all of the differing approaches taken by states, federal courts, and the 
Supreme Court, it seems nearly impossible to reconcile the differences in order 
to make one coherent legal policy.242 The proposed solution is to do away with 
the competing court rulings and implement a balancing test that will combine 
Supreme Court precedent with concepts from the differing lower court 
rulings.243 This solution is necessitated by the fact that warrantless use of mobile 
location data to track suspects by law enforcement can be constitutional under 
certain circumstances, but may be highly unconstitutional under others.244 
A. Location Data Taken Without a Warrant Are, and Are Not, Searches 
Depending on Each Case 
In the evolving world of technology, Americans are immersing themselves to 
greater depths in mobile devices and their associated risks.245 Due to the increase 
in mobile device use, law enforcement has adapted tracking methods to 
incorporate the data emanated from those devices.246 However, the combination 
                                                          
(11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 424, 438 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 241 Dolan, Lennon & Munoz, supra note 9, at 40–41 (discussing the history of relevant 
precedents set by the Supreme Court). 
 242 See Lauren E. Babst, No More Shortcuts: Protect Cell Site Location Data with a 
Warrant Requirement, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 383 (2015) (discussing 
the different conclusions reached throughout the United States federal jurisdiction). 
 243 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (discussing the different 
factors, courts have given weight to including the uses to which a person has put a location). 
 244 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430–31 (2012) (noting that the court need 
not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, 
for the line was surely crossed before the 4–week mark). 
 245 See Smith, supra note 23 (noting that over 68% of American adults now own 
smartphones); James M. Lucas, The Fourth Amendment - Are Mobile Phones Now 
Governmental Tracking Devices, 67 S.M.U. L. REV. 211, 216 (2014) (noting in 1986, there 
were only 340,213 mobile phone subscribers in the United States and there were 
approximately 315 million mobile phone subscribers in 2011). 
 246 Dolan, Lennon & Munoz, supra note 9, at 41 (stating that wireless technology has 
become a powerful tool in criminal investigation and prosecution as well as law 
enforcement); Babst, supra note 242, at 383 (quoting Justice Sotomayor’s concern about 
protecting location information, as she questioned the “appropriateness of entrusting to the 
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of mobile device use and law enforcement location data tracking creates serious 
concerns as to the amount of personal information being turned over to police, 
coupled with many suspects being tracked without a warrant.247 
1. Competing Strategies, Federal Court Rulings, and Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence 
Courts across the United States have been unable to agree on what kind of 
protection to give citizens, if any protection at all, in their mobile location 
data.248 Courts that follow the Skinner line of reasoning base protections on the 
fact that federal courts have determined no warrant is necessary for police to 
obtain location tracking data.249 Other courts follow California’s stance that a 
warrant is necessary for law enforcement to obtain any location data information 
from service providers, a stance that is often achieved through state 
legislation.250 Yet others have put citizens and law enforcement in the position 
of protecting privacy interests in some cases and not protecting those interests 
in other cases.251 With no clear consensus among lower courts, it would be 
logical to rely on the higher federal courts to sort out the matter because of their 
jurisdictional authority. 
However, higher federal courts have been no better at dealing with the 
problem. District courts have refused to follow circuit court rulings unless they 
                                                          
Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to 
misuse, especially in light of the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercise of 
police power to [sic] and prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance.’”). 
 247 See Dolan, Lennon & Munoz, supra note 9, at 41 (positing that the increased use of 
wireless technology as a law enforcement tool has lowered the barriers for acquiring any 
type of personal information from individuals’ devices); Babst, supra note 242, at 380 
(discussing that in order to properly analyze the scope of the privacy interests at stake, 
courts must account for the fact that modern technology can store vastly greater amounts of 
data and disclose much more revealing personal information than past technology); cf. Riley 
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014). 
 248 See Babst, supra note 242, at 383 (discussing the choices courts face when deciding 
whether to follow Supreme Court Fourth Amendment precedent from an era before modern 
cell phones, or instead consider what legal standards should apply in light of the dramatic 
changes in technology). 
 249 See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 774, 775 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
individuals do not have reasonable expectations of privacy in location data); Carpenter v. 
United States, 819 F.3d 880, 895 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. 
June 5, 2017) (No. 16–402). 
 250 See S. 178, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015). 
 251 See In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Communic’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 306–07 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(discussing a governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication 
service or remote computing service to disclose a record or other information pertaining to a 
subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications) 
only when the governmental entity obtains a warrant). 
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are in their jurisdiction; while not required to adopt circuit decisions outside their 
jurisdiction, this may tend to support the general disagreement between district 
courts over the proper application of Fourth Amendment law.252 Ledbetter came 
out of the District of Ohio, within the Sixth Circuit, and like its parent circuit, it 
determined that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy.253 Yet, In re 
Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. 
Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2015) rejected the Sixth Circuit’s ruling and since its 
parent the Ninth Circuit has no controlling precedent, held that the individual’s 
expectation of privacy was reasonable.254 Therefore, the ultimate decision must 
come from the Supreme Court, for only it can settle division among the lower 
federal courts. 
Even the Supreme Court is not entirely enlightening on this issue because it 
has a history of rulings that lead to different conclusions.255 In Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), the Court set the tone for police surveillance 
being permissible when the individual assumes the risk that their information 
could be turned over to police.256 Yet, the Jones ruling flipped the tables and 
held that it is unconstitutional for law enforcement to use GPS tracking on 
personal property to track suspects’ movements.257 The problem is that the Court 
has never taken a case where the issue solely revolved around CSLI and location 
data tracking; the closest is arguably Riley, but even that does not entirely fit into 
the mold of warrantless CSLI and location data tracking.258 
Perhaps the Court will use Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 
2015), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. June 5, 2017) (No. 16–402), to 
settle the issue once and for all.259 Carpenter asks the Court to consider whether 
                                                          
 252 See supra Part II. 
 253 United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-080, 2015 WL 7758930, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 
2015 Dec. 2, 2015). 
 254 See In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 
F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding that individuals have an expectation of 
privacy in the historical CSLI associated with their cell phones, and that such an expectation 
is one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable). 
 255 See also supra Part III. 
 256 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (holding that it would be 
unreasonable for the depositor to expect for his financial records to remain private). 
 257 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that the Government’s 
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the 
vehicle’s movements, constitutes a “search”). 
 258 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480–81 (2014) (focusing on the physical 
inspection of Riley’s mobile device for pictures, text messages, videos, and other forms of 
CSLI contained on the phone itself). 
 259 See Hurley, supra note 40 (recognizing the need for the Supreme Court to make clear 
that Fourth Amendment protections apply with undiminished force to sensitive cellphone 
digital records). 
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the warrantless seizure and search of 127 days of CSLI data to track Carpenter’s 
movements is constitutional.260 However, while this may be the timeliest and 
most relevant case to reach the Court, there is no guarantee the Court will address 
the underlying issue of privacy rights in one’s CSLI data considering how the 
Court has avoided the issue at almost every turn or chose to rule on other points 
of law.261  
2.  Individual Privacy Rights, The Fourth Amendment, and Balancing 
Individual privacy and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment 
should be protected to the fullest extent of the law. Yet the protections should 
not interfere with the police’s duty to protect the public.262 Courts need to 
undertake a balancing of public interest against personal privacy expectations 
extending beyond the traditional secure-in-one’s-home analysis.263 This would 
be different from the traditional reasonableness test because it builds upon, and 
expands, the test already in place to cover electronic devices.264 As discussed in 
Quon, legal jurisprudence has not caught up to expanding use of mobile 
devices.265 The American legal landscape has changed in the six years since 
Quon, as there are now more research studies, public opinion polls, and legal 
jurisprudence on Americans’ use of mobile devices and privacy expectations 
society attaches to information on the devices.266 
                                                          
 260 See Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880, 886 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 85 
U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. June 5, 2017) (No. 16–402). 
 261 Hurley, supra note 40. The Court is just as likely to punt the issue by merely deciding 
another point of law as it is to decide the issue of CSLI privacy rights. It may choose to 
follow the Smith approach that this culmination of days is unconstitutional without a 
warrant, without even touching the underlying issues. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 404 (2012); In re Application of United States for an Order for Prospective Cell 
Site Location Information on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
 262 See Rosenbaum, supra note 59 (discussing the public’s opinions on privacy 
protections and national security); Moore, supra note 60; Tracey Maclin, The Central 
Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. Rᴇᴠ. 197, 238 (1993) (discussing 
the balance between Fourth Amendment protections and responsibilities and duties of police 
officers in maintaining law and order in American society). 
 263 See Rosenbaum, supra note 59 (discussing the public’s opinions on privacy 
protections and national security). 
 264 See id. (detailing how Americans are torn between protecting their mobile devices 
and allowing the government to protect the entire society); Maclin, supra note 262, at 211. 
 265 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 748 (2010) (recognizing that the Court 
did not have enough information or expertise to gauge whether society was in favor of 
protecting mobile device information or if it was willing to allow the government leeway in 
searching the information). 
 266 See Rainie, supra note 58 (finding that 74% of Americans believe it is very important 
they are in control of who gets their information, and 65% say it is very important they be 
able to control what information is collected about them). 
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In a Pew Research Center study, 5% of Americans surveyed were “very 
confident” the records kept by their mobile device’s service provider were 
private and secure, whereas 31% were “not at all confident.”267 Additionally, 
when asked how confident they were that their search engine history records, 
social media site records, and online video site records would be kept secure and 
private, 1% of Americans were “very confident.”268 While the survey may show 
that Americans are very skeptical about the security of CSLI and location data 
searches, it more likely shows that they have a very low expectation of privacy 
for their information in those mediums.269 There is something inherently 
disturbing when considering that Americans do not feel that their private and 
sensitive information are protected from the prying eyes of their own 
government.270 
The current reasonableness test has been used by every circuit court to rule in 
favor of law enforcement,271 yet that test is outdated and does not take into 
account the modern development of mobile-device technology and sentiment 
that Americans attach to their devices.272 In 1903, Edgar Kinkead stated, “Next 
to the security of one’s person, life and health, the safety of his belongings and 
possessions from disturbance is the most valuable of all his civil rights.”273 That 
statement is as relevant today as it was in 1903, and perhaps even more relevant. 
Americans value their mobile devices like they value jewelry, watches, and their 
passports.274 In fact, 62% of Americans get information about health conditions 
                                                          
 267 Id. 
 268 Rainie, supra note 58 (stating for search engine history, 41% were “not at all 
confident”; for social media records, 45% were “not at all confident”; and for online video 
site records, 42% were “not at all confident”). 
 269 See id. 
 270 Id. (stating that America is meant to be a “free” country in which its citizens are not 
harassed by the government and can live in a manner that is free from the oversight of Big 
Brother at every turn); Ms. Smith, Americans feel they have no privacy, don’t trust 
government or advertisers, CSO (Nov. 12, 2014, 3:55 PM), 
https://www.csoonline.com/article/2846048/microsoft-subnet/americans-feel-they-have-no-
privacy-dont-trust-government-or-advertisers.html. 
 271 Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct 1867, 1871 (1989) (“[A]ll claims that law enforcement 
officers have used excessive force– deadly or not– in the course of an arrest, investigatory 
stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment 
and its objective ‘reasonableness’ standard.”). 
 272 Id.; see Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (stating that modern mobile 
devices are a pervasive part of Americans’ daily lives, and that any test must take that factor 
into account). 
 273 See 2 EDGAR KINKEAD, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF TORTS: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
DISCUSSION OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING CIVIL WRONGS EX DELICTO 983 
(1903) (highlighting the importance of feeling confident in one’s personal privacy rights). 
 274 Cf. Smith, supra note 23 (showing that over half of Americans with mobile devices 
use them on a daily and constant basis). 
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on their mobile devices, 57% do online banking, 40% look up government 
information, and 43% find information about jobs.275 
Most informative is that Americans in 2016 overwhelmingly felt that it is 
“very important” to control who can get information on them and what 
information is collected.276 Coupled with 46% saying they “couldn’t live 
without” their mobile devices,277 there is an expectation of privacy in the 
information and CSLI that mobile devices emit on a near-constant basis.278 It 
stands to reason that Americans now, more than ever, value their mobile data 
and location information privacy.279 
While it may appear that location data can be included under the data 
protected by the Court in Riley,280 a distinction must be made.281 The data 
searched on Riley’s mobile device was akin to data that might be found on a 
camera, laptop, iPod, tablet, or other device containing personal information and 
memories.282 Yet, location data was not seized from his mobile device, and the 
Court did not explicitly include location data in its holding.283 Location data is 
an extremely specific subset of information data that is stored on mobile 
devices.284 Location data, which is technically known as “cell site location 
information” (CSLI), encompasses any signals or location-specific information 
transmitted from a device to a cell tower.285 
Searches and seizures of this data need to be protected through warrants 
because they are the modern equivalent of one’s most personal secrets.286 For 
                                                          
 275 Id. 
 276 See Rainie, supra note 58 (discussing Americans’ attitudes about personal 
information privacy). 
 277 Smith, supra note 23. 
 278 Id. 
 279 Id. 
 280 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014) (stating that some of the data 
accessed by police included contact lists, text messages, videos, photographs, and 
messages). 
 281 See id. at 2480 (stating that some of the data accessed by police included contact lists, 
text messages, videos, photographs, and messages). 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. at 2489 (discussing the importance of location data to new electronic devices 
despite the case not explicitly involve location data, therefore setting the tone for future 
cases purely involving location data). 
 284 See In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 
F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1013–15 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 285 See supra Section II.A. 
 286 See Michael Grothaus, iPhone 7 vs Samsung Galaxy S7: The BIG Flagship Fight 
Rages On, KNOW YOUR MOBILE (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.knowyourmobile.com/mobile 
phones/apple-iphone-7/23410/iphone-7-vs-samsung-galaxy-s7-edge-specs-features-price-
detailed-ios-10-android-n (showing that since the release of the first iPhone by Apple in 
2007, the mobile device has become implanted into the average American’s daily life 
because they provide GPS services, banking services, news services, and store unimaginable 
amounts of data); Rainie, supra note 58 (acknowledging 65% of Americans want to control 
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example, had the British known where and when General Washington’s troops 
were crossing the Delaware River, the American Revolution may have ended 
very differently. Similarly, if the government knows citizens’ whereabouts at all 
times, there is an inherent breakdown of personal freedoms and protections.287 
3. Post-September 11 America, the PATRIOT Act, and New American 
Expectations 
It has been over fifteen years since September 11, 2001, and Americans have 
moved beyond the terror-infused mentality that spurred the government to 
collect troves of data for “security” reasons.288  In recent twenty-first century 
America, a majority of Americans are not willing to sacrifice their personal 
liberties and privacy rights to the same degree to allow collecting and retaining 
data.289 There is a definite difference between the years immediately following 
the terrorist attacks in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. where 
Americans were willing to allow passage of such laws as the PATRIOT Act,290 
and today where Americans have slid more towards the middle of protecting the 
nation but also not invading personal liberties.291 
The PATRIOT Act was one of the most all-encompassing and comprehensive 
national security laws to be passed in modern America,292 and with that came a 
greatly diminished sense of personal privacy and security in one’s electronic 
communications.293 At that time, Americans were willing to forego those 
                                                          
what information is collected about them). 
 287 See infra Section IV.A.3. 
 288 Rosenbaum, supra note 59 (highlighting the opinion of one man, “[t]his is a scary 
world and if it helps find terrorists or helps combat the war against terrorism, then it’s 
OK.”). 
 289 See Rainie, supra note 58 (noting that 65% of Americans say there are not enough 
limits on what telephone and internet data the government can collect on citizens); Susan 
Milligan, A Question of Risk, U.S. Nᴇᴡs (June 12, 2015, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015/06/12/privacy-or-terrorism-a-
question-of-risk (finding that Americans are now less willing to give up privacy to protect 
them from terrorism). 
 290 David W. Moore, Public Little Concerned About Patriot Act, GALLUP (Sept. 9, 2003),  
http://news.gallup.com/poll/9205/public-little-concerned-about-patriot-act.aspx. 
 291 Id.; Rosenbaum, supra note 59; Milligan, supra note 289 (finding that Americans are 
now less willing to give up privacy to protect them from terrorism). 
 292 See Dara Lind, Everyone’s heard of the Patriot Act. Here’s what it actually does, 
VOX (June 2, 2015), https://www.vox.com/2015/6/2/8701499/patriot-act-explain; Jeremy 
Diamond, Everything you need to know about the Patriot Act debate, CNN (May 23, 2015, 
1:44 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/05/22/politics/patriot-act-debate-explainer-
nsa/index.html. 
 293 See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. §§ 201-03, 209, 213-14 
(allowing the government to intercept communications related to terrorism and computer 
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protections and securities in order to secure the nation against future terrorist 
attacks and foreign actions.294 However, Americans have generally moved away 
from that mentality, due to the passage of time from the attack and newfound 
technology, to a mentality that leans more towards protecting personal 
information unless it is for extreme national security purposes.295 
It is high time that the Supreme Court, and thus all American courts, recognize 
a new and expanded reasonableness test to deal with the advent of modern 
technology, mobile-device use, and American expectations of privacy in 
electronic information. That new and expanded test would be served well by the 
creation of a legally recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement.296 Such a new exception to the warrant requirement could be 
effectuated through a modernized reasonableness test focusing on balancing the 
rights and interests of the individual against the interests of the government in 
preventing crime.297 
B. Create a New Exception to the Warrant Requirement by a Modern Take on 
a Traditional Test 
The Supreme Court has a duty to settle the issue of law enforcement obtaining 
mobile-device location data through warrantless compulsion of service 
providers. This question, how far police and the government can go to use 
location data against a person when the data was obtained without a warrant, has 
been skirted or only addressed in generalities by the Court to date.298 With the 
                                                          
fraud, share criminal investigative information, seize voice-mail messages with warrants, 
delay notification of a warrant being issued, and modify the law relating to pen registers); 
see Lind, supra note 292. 
 294 See Rosenbaum, supra note 59; Lind, supra note 292. 
 295 See generally Owsley, supra note 9, at 224 (referencing Congressman Bliley’s 
concern over the government knowing too much about cell phone subscribers’ locations); 
Rosenbaum, supra note 59 (reporting privacy concerns as cell phone and GPS technology 
becomes more advanced). 
 296 See generally Roberto Iraola, New Detection Technologies and the Fourth 
Amendment, 47 S.D. L. REV. 8, 15 (2002) (explaining the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
clause and how the reasonableness clause has historically found refuge in unique 
circumstances). 
 297 Id. at 15–16. 
 298 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (finding a lack of “precise 
guidance” in how to determine what type of search to exempt from the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement); City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (stating that the 
judiciary must proceed with caution in not making a ruling before knowing where electronic 
communications fit into society); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (holding that a 
police officer’s viewing of an item in plain view does not constitute a search but physically 
moving furniture to see something does constitute a search); Ryan Birss, Alito’s Way: 
Application of Justice Alito’s Concurring Opinion in United States v. Jones to Cell Phone 
Location Data, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 899, 928 (2014) (concluding that the majority opinion in 
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ever-evolving and expanding world of mobile device communications and 
GPS,299 there needs to be a clear rule for courts to follow when facing such 
challenges.300 One solution is for the Supreme Court to create a newly 
recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.301 This 
exception would recognize the modern expectation of privacy in mobile devices, 
thereby making such tactics a search and allow police to bypass the warrant 
requirement only upon a sufficient showing of government need outweighing 
privacy interests.302 
1. Recognize the Modern Expectation of Privacy in One’s Mobile Device 
Location Data 
It is imperative for the Supreme Court to recognize that the average American 
has a strong, personal, and reasonable expectation of privacy when it comes to 
all data on his or her mobile devices, data that undeniably includes location-
based information.303 The Court should establish a binding presumption on the 
right to privacy of mobile-device location data, a presumption that makes it a 
search to obtain such data.304 However, that presumption should come with a 
                                                          
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) limits privacy interest in cell phone 
technology and noting that Justice Alito’s concurrence gives courts a way to allow 
Americans to have a reasonable expectation of privacy of their location through cell phone 
data). 
 299 See Elizabeth Gula Hodgson, The Propriety of Probable Cause: Why the U.S. 
Supreme Court Should Protect Historical Cell Site Data with a Higher Standard, 120 PA. 
ST. L. REV. 251, 277 n.195 (2015) (noting Congress recognizes an increase of triangulation 
and GPA usage with the advent of smartphones thus effecting a greater need for law 
enforcement to show probable cause to obtain a warrant). 
 300 See id. 
 301 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 (employing a balancing test that weighs the degree of 
intrusion upon an individual’s privacy compared to the degree needed for the promotion of 
government interests). 
 302 See infra Section IV.B.1–2; see also Exigent Circumstances, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/exigent_circumstances (last visited May 24, 2018) 
(defining the exigency exception) (applying the exigency exception when an officer does 
not have sufficient time to secure a warrant, reasonably believes safety is at risk, or 
reasonably believes that evidence will be destroyed). 
 303 See Babst, supra note 242, at 378–79 (showing that cell phone users take steps to 
privatize data tracking in their smartphones); cf. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (distinguishing 
that the third-party doctrine does not apply to CSLI and location data obtained directly 
through a mobile device or forced “pings”). See generally Smith, supra note 23 (stating that 
a “number of Americans” only access to the Internet is through a smartphone). 
 304 See In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 
F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (reasoning that mobile devices are considered 
modern “effects” protected under the Fourth Amendment); KINKEAD, supra note 273, at 283 
(recognizing that protecting one’s belongings and possessions is the most valuable civil 
rights besides health and security). 
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caveat that it is not absolute and may be rebutted by a strong showing of public 
need.305 
Courts must undertake a balancing of competing interests to determine the 
level of intrusion, expectation of privacy, and ultimate potential harm to the 
public.306 In a perfect world, police would also perform the balancing test in 
order to ensure accountability and privacy protections; however, this is not a 
perfect world and the most practical means of accomplishing the balancing test 
would likely have to remain within the purview of the courts.307 While it is true 
that Americans have a strong expectation of privacy in their personal location 
data,308 the reasonableness of that belief must be tempered by either a high or 
low expectation of privacy.309 It can be extremely high, as with one’s personal 
mobile device that is not used for work purposes.310 However, it can also be very 
low, as when the device is used primarily for work purposes.311 Americans 
cannot expect to retain their privacy rights to the full extent of constitutional 
protection when they receive a mobile device from an employer or contract to 
have information reviewed by another party.312 The proposed exception would 
have to make the delineation between purely personal devices and those that 
have a dual-purpose.313 As a correlation, the higher the expectation of privacy in 
                                                          
 305 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326–27 (1987) (presuming that a warrant is required, 
yet it can be avoided by a showing of probable cause that governmental interests outweigh 
the individual’s privacy interest); see also United States v. Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185, 2016 
WL 740246, at *3 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2016) (stating that there is no reasonable expectation 
of privacy when a person hands information to a third party). 
 306 See, e.g., Liming, supra note 223, at 729 (discussing how balancing tests best weigh 
the interests of law enforcement and citizens to determine which has the stronger argument 
and considering the total reasonableness of the search, courts would be able to determine 
whether the obtained information was legitimate). 
 307 Cf. Baradaran, supra note 10, at 8–9 (2013) (describing “blind balancing” as a judge’s 
unbiased balance between privacy rights and societal safety). 
 308 See Rainie, supra note 58. 
 309 See id. (reporting 52% of Americans being concerned about government surveillance 
of their data). 
 310 See United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 608–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(discussing how DEA agents used pen registers and CSLI relating to a personal mobile 
device to track the whereabouts of a suspect). 
 311 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 752 (2010) (displaying example of an 
individual using a mobile device provided by an employer for uses outside scope of 
employment and showing Quon’s presumed low expectation of privacy in work provided 
pager through his signed statement of “no expectation of privacy”). 
 312 See id. at 764 (holding that search of employer provided pager due to employee’s 
repeated excessive non-work related text messages was reasonable because pager was 
provided for work-related purposes and search was not excessive in scope). 
 313 Compare Quon, 560 U.S. at 752  (describing employee using employer provided 
pager for personal reasons); with United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 614 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that people with personal cell phones are not voluntarily giving 
their location data to a third party each time they turn on their smartphone). 
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the eyes of the public, the more likely courts would be able to find that obtaining 
location data without a warrant constitutes an impermissible search.314 
Having the Supreme Court engage in a balancing test between the potential 
harm to the public versus the rights of the individual is not a wildly revolutionary 
concept.315 It is generally accepted that courts conduct balancing tests to weigh 
the safety and welfare of society against the individual’s personal privacy 
interests.316 This portion of the test should look very similar to other Fourth 
Amendment balancing tests, in that the overall determination concerns when the 
public’s welfare and safety becomes threatened at a rate disproportionate to the 
individual’s need for privacy.317 When this occurs, obtaining location data 
without a warrant may become necessary and expected.318 However, this burden 
must be placed on the government and not the individual. The government has 
vast resources at its disposal to aid in the apprehension of suspects, and therefore 
must show that no other alternative was available. 
                                                          
 314 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (stating modern mobile 
devices contain more information about a person than what a search of a traditional house 
would reveal); Rainie, supra note 58 (reporting 74% of Americans want to be in control of 
who has access to their information and 65% want to be able to control what information is 
collected by the government). With Americans feeling so strongly about protecting their 
privacy, the Court needs to acknowledge that privacy interests have extended beyond the 
traditional home search. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (finding 
that people cannot have an expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they dial on a 
phone); see also Rainie, supra note 58 (reporting that over 60% of Americans believe the 
government is not doing enough to keep data private); Rosenbaum, supra note 59 (reporting 
privacy concerns as cell phone and GPS technology becomes more advanced). 
 315 Cf.  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2478 (2014) (finding information on a cell 
phone found on person incident to arrest does not further government interest and does 
implicate a “substantially greater” privacy interest than a simple pat down of clothing); City 
of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 757 (2010) (stating that a reasonableness standard should 
be used when balancing employee privacy rights and work related conduct); United States v. 
Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427–28 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (finding that making and receiving 
calls and texts on mobile device is like the pen register in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 
(1979) where defendant voluntarily gave information to cell phone carrier towers and 
“assumed the risk” of that third party giving the information to the government). 
 316 David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee DNA and Other Biometric 
Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095, 1109 (2013) (stating that the circuit courts apply the 
Supreme Court of the United States’ Fourth Amendment balancing test between government 
interest and individual privacy rights in their decisions); see also United States v. Graham, 
824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016); Quon, 560 U.S. at 759–760; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488. 
 317 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494 (holding the interests of society can be weighed against 
the privacy rights of the individual in an exigent situation); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 
649, 657 (1984) (finding that the safety of society outweighed the privacy interest of suspect 
when he hid a gun in a supermarket and police asked him where it was before reading his 
Miranda rights). 
 318 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494 (holding that, generally, a warrant is required to search a 
cell phone incident to arrest but there may be an exigency situation to justify a warrantless 
search of a specific phone). 
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2. Overcoming the Presumption of Privacy Inherent in Mobile Device Location 
Data 
If the government shows there is a low expectation of privacy, intrusion would 
be minimal, and potential harm to the public could be great, the presumption 
would be rebutted.319 The reason for a rebuttable presumption is that there will 
be instances where the government and law enforcement need to protect public 
safety in a small window of time.320 As with other exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, this exception must be narrowly tailored to specific reasons for 
which the government would be able to bypass obtaining a warrant.321 The 
government’s strongest argument would come by relying on the third-party 
doctrine to differentiate between instances where the police search a mobile 
device’s content or force the device to perform, and where location data is 
merely obtained from a service provider.322 If it can show that the location data 
was obtained similar to a situation like a pen register, there is more legal weight 
to the argument.323 
While it may seem that creating exceptions to the warrant requirement allow 
the government to bypass a constitutional protection, that is not the case.324 
There is a reason that exceptions to the warrant requirement are so few and far 
between, and the solution posited does not advocate for the weakening of 
personal protections. Rather, this exception and test would allow for a judicially 
recognized presumption of the individual’s right to privacy in their mobile 
device’s location data while also giving the government the opportunity to 
                                                          
 319 See Owsley, supra note 9, at 227 (stating that under the third-party doctrine, cell 
phone users arguably do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location data 
transmitted from their device). 
 320 See, e.g., United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-080, 2015 WL 7758930, at *3–5, 
12 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2015) (denying defendant’s motion to suppress cell phone records 
because traffic stop and vehicle search uncovering two cell phones were lawful along with 
subsequent subpoena for cell phone records, and finding defendant coming under the third-
party doctrine when using a cell phone and cell carrier to conduct murders). 
 321 See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482, 2494 (holding that a warrant is needed to search a 
cell phone incident to arrest, and acknowledging the exceptions that exist to prevent  the 
destruction of evidence and when a police officer is pursuing a fleeing suspect, assisting 
injured persons, or assisting persons threated with imminent injury). 
 322 THOMPSON, supra note 11, at 11 (stating that the government can obtain data 
information from cell carriers under the Smith third-party and assumption of risk doctrines). 
Getting the location data from a provider, which would be considered a third-party, would 
make the search more like the installation of a pen register than directly tapping a phone. 
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (finding that when a phone number is 
dialed, the dialer is conveying that information to a third party). 
 323 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (finding that telephone users must convey the number 
they are dialing to a telephone company’s switch board). 
 324 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 764 (2010) (finding that search did not 
become unreasonable when the government obtained information from a third party). 
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protect public safety in instances where obtaining a warrant would unfairly 
compromise public welfare.325 
3. Shaping the New Exception to the Warrant Requirement and a Proffered 
Example 
The novelty of this solution is that it creates an exception to the warrant 
requirement, recognizing the modern-day importance of location data to 
Americans while also allowing law enforcement to perform its duty of protecting 
citizens.326 Courts need to adhere to the test established by Justice Harlan in 
recognizing societal interests in protecting personal data information.327 Yet an 
overarching and absolute protection of location data would prejudice law 
enforcement’s ability to keep people safe and prevent crime.328 That is why 
creating an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement would be 
a viable solution to this issue. It would allow for the presumption of societal 
interest in protecting location data while also giving police the opportunity to 
overcome the presumption in special cases.329 
Using a balancing test, courts would be able to determine whether the 
government met its burden to overcome the newly recognized protection of 
mobile-device location data.330 Take for example the Boston Marathon Bombing 
in 2013; had the police been able to dispense of the traditional procedure of 
obtaining a warrant, the Tsarnaev brothers, modern-day terrorists, may have 
                                                          
 325 See supra Section IV.B.1; see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327–28 (1987) 
(holding that dispensing of the need for warrants in some circumstances is not the same as 
accepting a lesser standard than what a warrant would mandate). 
 326 United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 437–38 (4th Cir. 2016) (affirming the district 
court’s holding that the government did not violate the Fourth Amendment when it acquired 
CSLI records from the defendant’s cell phone carrier). 
 327 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(establishing a two-part test for search in that the first part is a subjective belief of privacy 
and the second part is society’s objective belief in recognizing that privacy). 
 328 See, e.g., Rob Cerullo, GPS Tracking Devices and the Constitution, POLICE CHIEF, 
Aug. 2016, at 2 (showing cases where warrantless GPS use by police upheld by courts and 
warning against restricting use too much and rendering law enforcement unable to perform 
its duties). 
 329 See supra Section V.B.1–2. 
 330 See, e.g., Baradaran, supra note 10, at 57 (stating that while no balancing test is fair, it 
is needed so a judge does not rely merely on her gut intuition). Unlike the “blind balancing” 
concept Professor Baradaran advocates against, a proper balancing test in this warrant 
requirement exception would eliminate judges considering costs and benefits to parties and 
society which lacks relevance and completeness. When applying “blind balancing,” judicial 
members are prone to ignoring important evidence which provides context to the individual 
case before the bench. Id. 
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been apprehended sooner and lives saved.331 Police could have easily 
demonstrated to a court that the government’s interest in protecting the public 
from suspected terrorists in this instance far outweighed the Tsarnaevs’ privacy 
interest in protecting their location data.332 This type of event would satisfy the 
exception. 
The purpose of recognizing a new exception to the warrant requirement, and 
using a balancing test for that exception, is to provide individualized, case-by-
case analysis of Fourth Amendment legal issues in a twenty-first century 
world.333 Law enforcement would still be able to obtain a warrant for CSLI and 
location data through traditional means. The new exception would simply 
provide a vehicle for recognizing public interest in location data privacy, provide 
situations where the government could dispense with obtaining a warrant, and 
settle the debate over constitutionality of warrantless searches of mobile-device 
location data.334 
C. Addressing Counterarguments from the Majority of Scholarship 
As with any scholarly issue there will be counterarguments to the solution 
advocated. With a modern issue like mobile device location data tracking, there 
are bound to be strong opinions on both sides of the debate.335 Addressing 
                                                          
 331 See generally O’Neill, supra note 69 (showing suspect’s data usage regarding 
bombing two months prior to crime). 
 332 Police could also have provided sufficient need for GPS location data from the 
phones due to the ongoing emergency. How GPS Works, GPS.GOV, 
http://www.gps.gov/multimedia/poster/ (last modified Sep. 26, 2016). 
 333 See The Problem with Mobile Phones, SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE, 
https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/problem-mobile-phones  (last updated Feb. 10, 2015) 
(discussing the surveillance problems associated with the ubiquity of mobile devices being 
used a primary means of communication); see also Baradaran, supra note 10, at 57–58 
(quoting Professor Baradaran) (“[J]udicial balancing ignores broader evidence the provides 
context to the individual case at hand.”). A case-by-case approach would dispose of cases 
and issues before courts in a fair and constitutional manner. Id. 
 334 See Rainie, supra note 58 (presenting data regarding Americans general concerns 
about location data privacy). Compare United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-080, 2015 
WL 7758930, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2015) (denying defendant’s motion to suppress 
evidence obtained from the government’s use of cell site location information), with In re 
Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 
1013 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (denying the government’s application “to obtain historical cell site 
location information associated with [Redacted] target cell phones”), and United States v. 
Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (granting the defendant’s motion to 
suppress evidence recovered by DEA agents use of cell site location), and United States v. 
Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185(JAM), 2016 WL 740246, at *1 (D. Conn. 2016) (denying the 
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence acquired by the government’s use of cell site 
location information). 
 335 See Dolan, Lennon & Munoz, supra note 9, at 38–41 (recognizing privacy advocates’ 
increasing concerns with the potential for covert police surveillance of mobile device GPS 
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counterarguments against one’s solution while acknowledging potential 
weaknesses is a vital step towards furthering theory and debate. 
1. Fundamental “American” Rights of Privacy and Security in Oneself and 
Possessions 
There is a pervasive notion that individual rights and security are an inherently 
“American” concept that cannot be encroached upon.336 A large portion of 
scholarship supports the view that mobile device location data is the modern 
equivalent of one’s essential property and should therefore be protected against 
governmental search.337 However, mobile devices are only tools for making life, 
arguably, easier; they do not hold the same legal significance as the home or 
birth certificate. Unlike one’s wallet or social security card, which can be 
zealously guarded and physically protected, mobile device data is sent via cell 
towers, uploaded onto social media, downloaded and stored by service 
providers, and easily accessible by third parties.338 History has shown that these 
rights are curbed against the overall interests of society and the protection of the 
Union.339 Therefore, it stands to reason that case law indicating one’s mobile 
                                                          
data and acknowledging that courts have yet to definitively take a stance against the Fourth 
Amendment violations such surveillance poses). 
 336 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (“A double security arises to the 
rights of the people . . . It is of great importance in a republic . . . to guard one part of the 
society against the injustice of the other part . . . If a majority be united by a common 
interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”). 
 337 Ross Hoogstraten, Implications on the Constitutionality of Student Cell Phone 
Searches Following Riley v. California, 24 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 879, 911 (2016) 
(arguing that warrantless searches of cell phones are unreasonable “almost in every context 
because of the reasonable expectation of privacy” one has in the data on the device, which 
outweighs government concerns); Jordan Miller, New Age Tracking Technologies in the 
Post-United States v. Jones Environment: The Need for Model Legislation, 48 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 553, 603 (2015) (arguing that the best way to protect individuals from wide-ranging 
government searches is “to adopt comprehensive legislation . . . able to predict the future 
developments of technology . . . as technology advances in the field of tracking searches.”). 
 338 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 61, at 2–4 (explaining how mobile devices and the 
information stored within them can be accessed by anyone with the devices’ unlocking 
combination or password to personal websites, whereas a wallet and social security card 
must physically be taken in order to be used by another person); THOMPSON, supra note 11, 
at 7 (discussing the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and “government access to 
records and other information held by third parties”). 
 339 Marc McAllister, GPS and Cell Phone Tracking: A Constitutional and Empirical 
Analysis, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 207, 235 (2013) (demonstrating that the Supreme Court has 
reasoned that a “search” considers whether “society is prepared to recognize [a defendant’s 
asserted expectation of privacy] as reasonable which shows that consideration of individual 
interests against government searches turns on whether society believes that the individual 
should be free from such searches.” Protecting the interests of society comes before the 
interests of the individual when the individual’s interest would harm society). 
2018] Privacy vs. Protection 47 
device is not necessarily his or her “castle” may be in line with historical Fourth 
Amendment analysis.340 
Another line of argument for requiring location data to be obtained only 
through a warrant is that Riley v. California should be read broadly, extending 
well beyond the search-incident-to-arrest exception.341 The basis for this claim 
is the belief that the Court in Riley created a per se rule that requires a warrant 
every time content is accessed on mobile devices.342 In his argument, one author 
states, “Many of the cases taking a narrow view of Riley ignore the vast storage 
capacity that cell phones have, frustrating the qualitative differences that the 
Court saw between these devices and other articles.”343 However, this argument 
fails to consider the fact that Riley was a unanimous decision from the Court.344 
This is a feat that would arguably have been impossible to attain if the ruling 
were to be read broadly as applying to almost any situation involving mobile 
devices. 
The “Conservative Wing,” for example, would be very unlikely to vote for a 
consistently broad interpretation that does not consider every applicable 
factor.345 Broadly interpreting the decision, as pointed out, would suffer the same 
flaws as narrowly interpreting the decision.346 Yet, it would also create an 
expansive interpretation beyond the Court’s holding. 347 Weight must be given 
to the Court refusing to specifically address the privacy protections inherent in 
location data and CSLI in Riley, a fact tending to caution against broad 
application of the holding.348 Besides the above mentioned counter arguments, 
a substantial amount of scholarship claims that the only reason warrantless 
location data tracking is considered constitutional is because of surveillance 
                                                          
 340 See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 781 (6th Cir. 2012) (reasoning that since 
GPS data is inherently included in the communicative feature of mobile devices, and users 
know that such communications are not private, the defendant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his location data). 
 341 Bryan Sandford, A Castle in the Sky: GPS Tracking of a Defendant’s Cell Phone 
Post–Riley v. California, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 907, 938 (2015) (arguing that reading Riley’s 
holding narrowly “ignores the plain language of the decision and frustrates the underlying 
policy articulated by the Court.”). 
 342 See id. at 909–10 (arguing that the Court’s recent decisions support a per se rule 
which would require courts to apply every warrant requirement exception to see if any fit, 
before allowing the police to obtain data without a warrant). 
 343 Id. at 922. 
 344 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2014). 
 345 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987) (stating that overly-broad holdings 
would jeopardize doctrinal theories protecting the authority of police to make warrantless 
searches and seizures in public places). 
 346 Sandford, supra note 341, at 938. 
 347 See LaChance, supra note 8 (arguing that a warrant is still necessary regardless of cell 
phones’ technological advances and efficiencies). 
 348 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2480, 2490, 2492, 2494 (2014) (addressing the 
important role cell phone location data can play in proving an individual’s guilt). 
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statues enacted by Congress.349 
2. Congressionally Enacted Surveillance Statutes Provide the Only 
Justification to Warrantless Location Data Tracking Being Considered 
Constitutional 
Some academics have claimed that the constitutionality of location data 
tracking without a warrant is doubtful at best, and the legal basis can only be 
found in surveillance statutes.350 Such statutes are binding law, and when 
consumers willingly leave their location tracking apps open on their mobile 
devices, they are put on notice as to the ramifications. 351 If citizens do not want 
their locations tracked via GPS, they only have to disable GPS capabilities of 
their mobile devices. A counter to that reasoning is that misinterpretation of 
landmark Supreme Court Fourth Amendment decisions risks eroding civil 
liberties.352 Claiming that since the public does not favor a “surveillance state” 
the Court must follow public opinion misinterprets the American system’s 
foundation upon checks and balances between coequal branches of 
government.353 
Americans expect the freedom to move about in relative anonymity, without 
the government keeping an individualized itinerary of their comings and 
                                                          
 349 See infra Section IV.C.2. 
 350 See Ian James Samuel, Warrantless Location Tracking, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324, 
1351 (2008) (“[T]he ‘right to be let alone’ does not mean much if, thanks to the vicarious 
presence of the state in one’s phone, solitude is an illusion.”); see also Nathaniel Wackman, 
Historical Cellular Location Information and the Fourth Amendment, 2015 U. ILL. REV. 
263, 315, 318 (2015) (recognizing that Congress has legislated the Stored Communications 
Act to regulate such searches, and advocates for amendments to include suppression 
remedies for location data seized). 
 351 The age-old legal doctrine that ignorance of the law is no excuse proves telling in this 
instance because consumers are given ample opportunity to decline third-party tracking and 
data sharing when they are given the choice of downloading and using a program, app or 
website. See Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Common Law, U. OF TORONTO L. SCH. 1, 45, 
52 (2011) (“Ignorance of a fact and inability to foresee a consequence have the same effect 
on blameworthiness.”). 
 352 See Tim Sheehan, Taking the Third-Party Doctrine Too Far, 13 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 181, 182 (2015) (claiming that public opinion at this time is “firmly in favor of 
curtailing, not enlarging, the surveillance state.”). 
 353 See, e.g., Baradaran, supra note 10, at 49–50 (stating that the judicial branch of 
government is supposed to be above the public’s influence; it cannot issue effective legal 
decisions if it is beholden to public whims); Sheehan, supra note 352, at 182 (explaining 
that the Supreme Court has never sought to issue a clear ruling on this topic, even though 
those arguing for a straight ban on compelling location data without a warrant would lead 
readers to believe that there is binding precedent supporting requiring a warrant in such 
circumstances). 
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goings.354 Latching onto this concept, an argument has been made that the 
constitutionality of warrantless tracking should depend upon the nature of the 
crime being investigated.355 Not only is this discrimination against certain 
classes of crimes, it would most likely constitute extreme selectivity of crimes 
that would be rebuked by courts and legislatures alike.356 Applying selective 
standards would be a step in the wrong direction and would only lead to more 
confusion for law enforcement and courts reviewing the actions of those law 
enforcement officers. 
One of the most common counterarguments is that the ubiquitous nature of 
mobile devices and technology in American society has created a new 
expectation of privacy in such property.357 Yes, technological advances can 
create modernized expectations of privacy. However, in a technological age it is 
also important to adapt the legal protections afforded to law enforcement.358 
Modern mobile devices allow those seeking to break the law to look up the 
locations they plan to visit, communicate GPS coordinates and roadmaps, hack 
                                                          
 354 See Renee M. Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth 
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 455 (2007) (“[C]itizens of this country largely expect 
the freedom to move about in relative anonymity without the government keeping an 
individualized, turn-by-turn itinerary of our comings and goings.”). This point aligns with 
the solution posited in this Note that there is a need for a test differentiating when the 
freedom to move about should be protected and when it is heavily outweighed by the public 
interest because public opinion is only one factor considered for whether privacy 
expectations are reasonable and must be weighed against the potential harm to society. See 
supra Section IV.B. 
 355 McAllister, supra note 339, at 250–53 (delineating three categories of individuals and 
standards to be applied: “Those Suspected of Severe Crimes,” “Those Suspected of Minor 
Crimes,” and “Those Not Suspected of Any Crime”); Adam M. Gershowitz, The Post-Riley 
Search Warrant: Search Protocols and Particularity in Cell Phone Searches, 69 VAND. L. 
REV. 585, 638 (2016) (arguing that “magistrates should not authorize police to. . . download 
and comb through millions of pages of data that is unrelated to the crime being 
investigated.”). 
 356 On top of that legal issue, there is the assumption that such a selective and 
discriminatory test would enrage the populace and receive little to no support from 
Congress. See McAllister, supra note 339, at 246–50 (analyzing public survey results and 
recent congressional and judicial decisions to prove a general societal preference to limit the 
government’s ability to obtain cell phone information from individuals without a warrant). 
 357 Owsley, supra note 9, at 230; see, e.g., Freiwald, supra note 10, at 748–49 (stating 
that a probable cause standard which requires notifying the target and providing meaningful 
remedies would make a significant difference in protecting individuals privacy rights from 
“government compulsion of disclosure of location data”); see also Suuberg, supra note 12, 
at 330 (pointing to the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s summary of a Sixth Circuit’s 
reasoning in a privacy protection case as being a harmful denial of “an expectation of 
privacy in cell phones.”). 
 358 See Freiwald, supra note 10, at 725 (stating that “Location data has furnished law 
enforcement with investigatory and prosecutorial value in the past several years.”); Cerullo, 
supra note 328, at 2 (“Advanced technology greatly enhances a police officer’s ability to 
fight crime.”). 
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into users’ bank accounts and social media sites, and countless other illegal 
acts.359 Not allowing law enforcement, under specific conditions, to access the 
information on those devices would lead to a gross imbalance of power between 
lawbreakers and the men and women whose duty it is to prevent violations of 
the law.360 It would harm society to hamstring the police by forcing them into 
using outdated technology and methods to find and track suspects.361 
Modern technology must be allowed to progress, and law enforcement must 
be able to similarly adapt.362 Arguments will inevitably be raised against this 
proposed solution; however, the fundamental issue of how to balance law 
enforcement’s needs and societal interests remains.363 Merely stating that there 
is a problem, and that it needs fixed, will not bring about change.364 Change can 
only come from educated discourse, on both sides of the issue, leading to a 
refined and balanced solution. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court must act sooner, rather than later, in taking 
up a litmus test case that will set new precedent for upcoming mobile device 
location tracking jurisprudence. By forming a new exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement, the Court will craft a more comprehensive 
and applicable standard for the inevitable rise in electronic-mobile cases.365 It is 
not enough to broadly hold that law enforcement’s obtaining of location tracking 
data from service providers is not a breach of the Fourth Amendment because 
that would be a travesty to the rights and freedoms protected under the 
Amendment.366 A test establishing factors relevant to a constitutional analysis 
will enable courts to protect against unwarranted searches at the same time as 
protecting individual privacy interests.367 Additionally, the test will give courts 
flexibility to weigh the interests of the public against the individual’s right to 
privacy, and in certain cases to uphold law enforcement’s use of location data 
                                                          
 359 Van Ells, supra note 24. 
 360 See supra Section IV.B. 
 361 See Cerullo, supra note 328, at 2 (noting that America cannot have it both ways: To 
be protected from modern crime, and to push law enforcement and government out of 
citizens’ location data completely); see also Dolan, Lennon & Munoz, supra note 9, at 39–
41 (highlighting cases wherein modern GPS tracking data has assisted investigators in 
solving cases by accurately tracing the locations of criminals). 
 362 See supra Section I.B.3. 
 363 See supra Section IV.B.1–3. 
 364 See supra Section IV.A-C. 
 365 See supra Section IV.B.3. 
 366 See supra Section IV.B.1. 
 367 See supra Section IV.B.3. 
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obtained without a warrant.368 
As America continually progresses into a more technologically advanced 
nation, the problem of law enforcement, and the government, using electronic 
location data to track suspects will only continue to fester.369 With the advent of 
even more advanced technology, Americans will immerse themselves to a 
greater degree into the electronic mobile world. The legal field needs to be ready 
to adapt to that new reality and recognize the inherent expectation of privacy in 
mobile-device location data.370 Without comprehensive and modernized mobile 
device jurisprudence, the risk of constitutional rights being trampled will only 
multiply.371 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 368 See supra Section IV.B.3. 
 369 See supra Section I.A. 
 370 See supra Part III. 
 371 See supra Sections IV.A-C. 
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